https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 16:01:04 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55524 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55524 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents</p> <p>The web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL to a fetcher that uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects - and re-resolves the hostname at connect time, with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is bypassable two independent ways: HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding.</p> <p>Affected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py - Single-shot validation (lines 229-238): if os.environ.get(&#34;ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL&#34;) != &#34;true&#34;: ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) # resolved ONCE, at validation time ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str) if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified: continue # rejected url_list.append(u) - Vulnerable fetch (_crawl_with_httpx, lines 142 / 149): follows redirects, re-resolves DNS, no re-check: with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client: response = client.get(url) # fallback: urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30) (also follows redirects by default) - web_crawl / crawl_web are registered tools (tools/__init__.py:156-157); httpx is the default fallback provider (dispatch at web_crawl_tools.py:269).</p> <p>The two bypasses: 1) Redir…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents</p> <p>The web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL to a fetcher that uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects - and re-resolves the hostname at connect time, with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is bypassable two independent ways: HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding.</p> <p>Affected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py - Single-shot validation (lines 229-238): if os.environ.get(&#34;ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL&#34;) != &#34;true&#34;: ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) # resolved ONCE, at validation time ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str) if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified: continue # rejected url_list.append(u) - Vulnerable fetch (_crawl_with_httpx, lines 142 / 149): follows redirects, re-resolves DNS, no re-check: with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client: response = client.get(url) # fallback: urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30) (also follows redirects by default) - web_crawl / crawl_web are registered tools (tools/__init__.py:156-157); httpx is the default fallback provider (dispatch at web_crawl_tools.py:269).</p> <p>The two bypasses: 1) Redir…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj