https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 10:34:14 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55537 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() accepts webhook_url when resolution raises socket.gaierror because the exception path uses except socket.gaierror: pass. JobExecutor._send_webhook() later performs a fresh lookup, allowing DNS changes to direct the request to an internal service. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() accepts webhook_url when resolution raises socket.gaierror because the exception path uses except socket.gaierror: pass. JobExecutor._send_webhook() later performs a fresh lookup, allowing DNS changes to direct the request to an internal service. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55537 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rg5q-pp8p-f7jm <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` validates webhook URLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS resolution fails (`socket.gaierror`), the validator **silently passes** the URL via `except socket.gaierror: pass`. Additionally, even when DNS succeeds at validation time, the webhook is fired much later by `JobExecutor._send_webhook()`, which calls `httpx.AsyncClient().post(job.webhook_url)` — performing a **fresh, independent DNS lookup** at execution time. Together, these flaws create a TOCTOU SSRF window.</p> <p>An attacker can: 1. Submit a job with `webhook_url` pointing to a hostname that currently does not resolve (NXDOMAIN) → validation passes (`gaierror` → `pass`) 2. Update DNS to point that hostname to `127.0.0.1` or another private IP 3. When the job completes, `_send_webhook()` resolves the hostname fresh → POST sent to the internal IP</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>**Flaw 1 — Fail-open on DNS error (`jobs/models.py` lines 58-66):**</p> <p>```python @field_validator(&#34;webhook_url&#34;) @classmethod def validate_webhook_url(cls, v): ... try: ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback or ip_obj.is_link_local: raise ValueError(&#34;Webhook URL resolves to private network address&#34;) except socket.gaierror: pass # &lt;-- FAIL-OPEN: DNS failure allows the URL without restriction return v ```</p> <p>When…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`praisonai/jobs/models.py::JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` validates webhook URLs by resolving the hostname and checking whether the IP is private. When DNS resolution fails (`socket.gaierror`), the validator **silently passes** the URL via `except socket.gaierror: pass`. Additionally, even when DNS succeeds at validation time, the webhook is fired much later by `JobExecutor._send_webhook()`, which calls `httpx.AsyncClient().post(job.webhook_url)` — performing a **fresh, independent DNS lookup** at execution time. Together, these flaws create a TOCTOU SSRF window.</p> <p>An attacker can: 1. Submit a job with `webhook_url` pointing to a hostname that currently does not resolve (NXDOMAIN) → validation passes (`gaierror` → `pass`) 2. Update DNS to point that hostname to `127.0.0.1` or another private IP 3. When the job completes, `_send_webhook()` resolves the hostname fresh → POST sent to the internal IP</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>**Flaw 1 — Fail-open on DNS error (`jobs/models.py` lines 58-66):**</p> <p>```python @field_validator(&#34;webhook_url&#34;) @classmethod def validate_webhook_url(cls, v): ... try: ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback or ip_obj.is_link_local: raise ValueError(&#34;Webhook URL resolves to private network address&#34;) except socket.gaierror: pass # &lt;-- FAIL-OPEN: DNS failure allows the URL without restriction return v ```</p> <p>When…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rg5q-pp8p-f7jm