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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 20:34:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-55535 — PraisonAI: Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55535</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, the Jobs API validate_webhook_url() path fails open on socket.gaierror and does not bind the validated address to the later request. An attacker webhook_url can later resolve to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or another internal address. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, the Jobs API validate_webhook_url() path fails open on socket.gaierror and does not bind the validated address to the later request. An attacker webhook_url can later resolve to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or another internal address. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55535</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hmfx-4v44-9qw9 — PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hmfx-4v44-9qw9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `webhook_url` field in the Jobs API silently passes validation when DNS resolution fails (`socket.gaierror`), enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker&amp;#39;s domain can initially resolve to a public IP (passing validation) then switch to an internal IP before the server makes the HTTP request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The validator catches `socket.gaierror` and silently allows the URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:55
try:
    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
    ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
    if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback:
        raise ValueError(&amp;#34;private address&amp;#34;)
except socket.gaierror:
    pass  # BUG: DNS failure silently ignored → SSRF bypass
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP call is made later with no re-validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:402
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
    await client.post(job.webhook_url, ...)  # no second IP check
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**DNS rebinding flow:**
1. Register `attacker.com` with TTL=1s → resolves to `1.2.3.4` (public IP)
2. Submit job: `webhook_url=http://attacker.com/callback`
3. Validation passes (public IP)
4. Switch DNS: `attacker.com` → `127.0.0.1`
5. Job completes → server POSTs to `127.0.0.1` → internal SSRF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Unresolvable domain bypass (no DNS rebinding required):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -d &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;prompt&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;run&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;webhook_url&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;http://unresolvable.internal/cb&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;agent_yaml&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;...&amp;#34;}&amp;#39;
# Validation: gaierror → pass → URL accepted
``…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `webhook_url` field in the Jobs API silently passes validation when DNS resolution fails (`socket.gaierror`), enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker&amp;#39;s domain can initially resolve to a public IP (passing validation) then switch to an internal IP before the server makes the HTTP request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The validator catches `socket.gaierror` and silently allows the URL:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:55
try:
    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
    ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
    if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback:
        raise ValueError(&amp;#34;private address&amp;#34;)
except socket.gaierror:
    pass  # BUG: DNS failure silently ignored → SSRF bypass
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The HTTP call is made later with no re-validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:402
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
    await client.post(job.webhook_url, ...)  # no second IP check
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**DNS rebinding flow:**
1. Register `attacker.com` with TTL=1s → resolves to `1.2.3.4` (public IP)
2. Submit job: `webhook_url=http://attacker.com/callback`
3. Validation passes (public IP)
4. Switch DNS: `attacker.com` → `127.0.0.1`
5. Job completes → server POSTs to `127.0.0.1` → internal SSRF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Unresolvable domain bypass (no DNS rebinding required):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -d &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;prompt&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;run&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;webhook_url&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;http://unresolvable.internal/cb&amp;#34;,&amp;#34;agent_yaml&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;...&amp;#34;}&amp;#39;
# Validation: gaierror → pass → URL accepted
``…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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