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BREW-glances-CVE-2026-62982 — Glances: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-32608: action-template sanitizer is bypassed by nested stat values (process 'cmdlin…

Affected: Homebrew: glances

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.5.2 until 4.5.6, _sanitize_mustache_dict() in glances/actions.py skips nested list and dictionary strings such as process cmdline values, allowing pipe characters to survive chevron.render() and be executed by secure_popen() through administrator-configured action templates. This issue is fixed in 4.5.6.

CVE-2026-62982 — Glances: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-32608: action-template sanitizer is bypassed by nested stat values (process 'cmdlin…

Affected: nicolargo glances

GHSA-73wf-9vmv-5pv9 — Glances: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-32608: action-template sanitizer is bypassed by nested stat values (process 'cmdlin…

Affected: PyPI: glances

## Summary CVE-2026-32608 ("Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates") was fixed (commit `5680a5d`) by adding `_sanitize_mustache_dict`, which replaces the shell operators `&&`, `|`, `>>`, `>` with spaces in the values rendered into action command templates.

The sanitizer only processes **top-level string** values (`if isinstance(v, str)`). Attacker-controlled **nested** values — most notably a process's **`cmdline`, which Glances exposes as a `list`** and which is fully attacker-controlled via argv — are passed through **unsanitized**. Because the Mustache renderer (`chevron`) does **not** HTML-escape the pipe character `|`, a `|` embedded in such a nested value survives into the rendered command and is then interpreted by `secure_popen` (which still interprets `&&`/`|`/`>` by default, `allow_operators=True`), re-introducing the exact command injection the CVE was meant to close.

## Details The fix (`glances/actions.py`): ```python _SHELL_OPERATORS = ('&&', '|', '>>', '>') # line 25

def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict): # line 28 ... for k, v in mustache_dict.items(): if isinstance(v, str): # line 40 <-- ONLY top-level strings for op in _SHELL_OPERATORS: v = v.replace(op, ' ') safe[k] = v else: safe[k] = v # nested list/dict passed VERBATIM return safe ``` R…