https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 21:32:33 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52776 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> oscal-compass compliance-trestle</p> <p>Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a tooling platform for managing compliance as code. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the URLSecurityValidator that guards trestle&#39;s remote-fetch paths against server-side request forgery can be bypassed to reach loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata, and internal network endpoints it was designed to block. The blocklist does not canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals such as [::ffff:169.254.169.254], which resolve to IPv6Address objects that never match the blocked IPv4 ranges, and it does not block the unspecified address 0.0.0.0, which routes to local services on Linux and inside containers. An attacker who can supply or influence an OSCAL artifact that trestle fetches, such as a malicious profile whose imports reference one of these bypass URLs, can cause the HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher paths to contact cloud instance-metadata services, loopback interfaces, or internal hosts. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> oscal-compass compliance-trestle</p> <p>Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a tooling platform for managing compliance as code. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the URLSecurityValidator that guards trestle&#39;s remote-fetch paths against server-side request forgery can be bypassed to reach loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata, and internal network endpoints it was designed to block. The blocklist does not canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals such as [::ffff:169.254.169.254], which resolve to IPv6Address objects that never match the blocked IPv4 ranges, and it does not block the unspecified address 0.0.0.0, which routes to local services on Linux and inside containers. An attacker who can supply or influence an OSCAL artifact that trestle fetches, such as a malicious profile whose imports reference one of these bypass URLs, can cause the HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher paths to contact cloud instance-metadata services, loopback interfaces, or internal hosts. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52776 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h47f-gmjp-m7rr <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`compliance-trestle` 4.0.3 (latest) ships an `URLSecurityValidator` in `trestle/core/remote/security.py` to block SSRF to loopback / link-local / cloud-metadata endpoints from the HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher remote-fetch paths. The allowlist is incomplete and can be bypassed by four equivalent address representations that resolve to the same blocked host but evade the validator&#39;s checks:</p> <p>- IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals (`[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`, `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`, `[::ffff:10.0.0.1]`) are returned by `socket.getaddrinfo` as `IPv6Address` objects; `IPv6Address in IPv4Network(&#39;169.254.0.0/16&#39;)` returns `False`, so the `_check_blocked_networks` and `_check_private_networks` predicates do not match. - IPv4 unspecified address `0.0.0.0` is not in `ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` (which covers `127.0.0.0/8` but not `0.0.0.0/8`); on Linux + Docker, `0.0.0.0` routes to local services on any interface, and on dual-stack-mapped sockets it also reaches loopback listeners.</p> <p>A malicious OSCAL profile referencing one of these URLs in `imports[*].href` or `back-matter.resources[*].rlinks[*].href` causes `HTTPSFetcher.__init__` and `_do_fetch` (which both invoke `validator.validate_url`) to pass the URL through to `requests.get`, contacting cloud-metadata services, loopback admin interfaces, or RFC 1918 internal networks (with `TRESTLE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true` set) that the validator was specifically designed to block.</p> <p>### Affected versions</p> <p>`compliance-trestle` (PyPI) versions `&lt;=…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: compliance-trestle</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>`compliance-trestle` 4.0.3 (latest) ships an `URLSecurityValidator` in `trestle/core/remote/security.py` to block SSRF to loopback / link-local / cloud-metadata endpoints from the HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher remote-fetch paths. The allowlist is incomplete and can be bypassed by four equivalent address representations that resolve to the same blocked host but evade the validator&#39;s checks:</p> <p>- IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals (`[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`, `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`, `[::ffff:10.0.0.1]`) are returned by `socket.getaddrinfo` as `IPv6Address` objects; `IPv6Address in IPv4Network(&#39;169.254.0.0/16&#39;)` returns `False`, so the `_check_blocked_networks` and `_check_private_networks` predicates do not match. - IPv4 unspecified address `0.0.0.0` is not in `ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` (which covers `127.0.0.0/8` but not `0.0.0.0/8`); on Linux + Docker, `0.0.0.0` routes to local services on any interface, and on dual-stack-mapped sockets it also reaches loopback listeners.</p> <p>A malicious OSCAL profile referencing one of these URLs in `imports[*].href` or `back-matter.resources[*].rlinks[*].href` causes `HTTPSFetcher.__init__` and `_do_fetch` (which both invoke `validator.validate_url`) to pass the URL through to `requests.get`, contacting cloud-metadata services, loopback admin interfaces, or RFC 1918 internal networks (with `TRESTLE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true` set) that the validator was specifically designed to block.</p> <p>### Affected versions</p> <p>`compliance-trestle` (PyPI) versions `&lt;=…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h47f-gmjp-m7rr