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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-70491 — Open WebUI: Tool source code disclosed to read-only users via the tool list and get endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-70491</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. In 0.10.2 and earlier, the GET /api/v1/tools/, GET /api/v1/tools/list, and GET /api/v1/tools/id/{id} endpoints in backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py returned full Python tool source to authenticated non-admin read-only users. ToolResponse deliberately omitted source and specs, but ToolUserResponse permitted extra fields and handlers spread a full tool model dump into the response, re-admitting omitted fields. A non-admin with a read grant can obtain another user&amp;#39;s server-side tool source, which commonly embeds hard-coded API keys, credentials, and internal service URLs. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. In 0.10.2 and earlier, the GET /api/v1/tools/, GET /api/v1/tools/list, and GET /api/v1/tools/id/{id} endpoints in backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py returned full Python tool source to authenticated non-admin read-only users. ToolResponse deliberately omitted source and specs, but ToolUserResponse permitted extra fields and handlers spread a full tool model dump into the response, re-admitting omitted fields. A non-admin with a read grant can obtain another user&amp;#39;s server-side tool source, which commonly embeds hard-coded API keys, credentials, and internal service URLs. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-70491</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3r7g-q6cg-q2vx — Open WebUI: Tool source code disclosed to read-only users via the tool list and get endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3r7g-q6cg-q2vx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A workspace tool shared with a read grant returned its full Python source to the recipient. Any authenticated non-admin who could use a shared tool could also read its source, including any user on the instance when a tool was shared publicly. Source is meant to be a writer-only tier: the list response schema deliberately omits it and source export sits behind its own permission. The read endpoints delivered it anyway.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authentication enabled (`WEBUI_AUTH=true`, default) and plugins enabled (`ENABLE_PLUGINS=true`, default).
- The attacker is an authenticated non-admin without the `workspace.tools` permission and without a write grant on the tool.
- A tool is shared with a read grant to the attacker, to one of their groups, or to all users (`user:*`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deployments that share no tools, or share them only with users who already hold write access, are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A non-admin obtains another user&amp;#39;s server-side tool source. Tool source commonly embeds hard-coded API keys, credentials and internal service URLs, so the practical loss frequently extends past the code itself. The attack needs no special permission beyond an ordinary account that a tool was shared with, and no user interaction. Confidentiality only: it grants no ability to create, modify or execute tools, and no integrity or availability impact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in 0.11.0 by commit `c05de13b4` (#27005) together with `310ae9130`. The per-id endpoint now drops the source for ca…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A workspace tool shared with a read grant returned its full Python source to the recipient. Any authenticated non-admin who could use a shared tool could also read its source, including any user on the instance when a tool was shared publicly. Source is meant to be a writer-only tier: the list response schema deliberately omits it and source export sits behind its own permission. The read endpoints delivered it anyway.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Authentication enabled (`WEBUI_AUTH=true`, default) and plugins enabled (`ENABLE_PLUGINS=true`, default).
- The attacker is an authenticated non-admin without the `workspace.tools` permission and without a write grant on the tool.
- A tool is shared with a read grant to the attacker, to one of their groups, or to all users (`user:*`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deployments that share no tools, or share them only with users who already hold write access, are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A non-admin obtains another user&amp;#39;s server-side tool source. Tool source commonly embeds hard-coded API keys, credentials and internal service URLs, so the practical loss frequently extends past the code itself. The attack needs no special permission beyond an ordinary account that a tool was shared with, and no user interaction. Confidentiality only: it grants no ability to create, modify or execute tools, and no integrity or availability impact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in 0.11.0 by commit `c05de13b4` (#27005) together with `310ae9130`. The per-id endpoint now drops the source for ca…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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