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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:24:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-59218 — Open WebUI: Account enumeration via observable login timing discrepancy</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59218</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the /api/v1/auths/signin endpoint looked users up by email and only ran bcrypt password verification when a credential existed, making registered-account attempts measurably slower than missing-email attempts and allowing unauthenticated account enumeration. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the /api/v1/auths/signin endpoint looked users up by email and only ran bcrypt password verification when a credential existed, making registered-account attempts measurably slower than missing-email attempts and allowing unauthenticated account enumeration. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59218</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7rw5-9f7q-xj36 — Open WebUI: Account enumeration via observable login timing discrepancy</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7rw5-9f7q-xj36</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/api/v1/auths/signin` endpoint leaked whether an email address belonged to a registered account through a response-time side channel. Password verification ran bcrypt only when the email was found in the database; for a non-existent email the request returned early without hashing. The expensive bcrypt comparison therefore made valid-account attempts respond significantly slower (~180 ms) than non-existent ones (~5 ms), so an unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts by measuring response time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On signin the backend looked the user up by email and only performed the bcrypt password comparison if a record existed. A missing email short-circuited before any hashing, producing the timing gap. The built-in brute-force throttling did not prevent it: sending one request at a time with a small delay between requests stays under the rate limit while still exposing the difference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observed in the reporter&amp;#39;s run (HTTP 400 for every attempt, the response time is the signal):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
Email                Status   Response time
joe@example.com      400      186 ms   &amp;lt;- valid account
larry@example.com    400        9 ms
jose@example.com     400        6 ms
james@example.com    400        5 ms
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate which email addresses are registered accounts, which enables targeted password-spraying against confirmed accounts. The impact is amplified by MFA not being enabled by default. No data is read or mo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/api/v1/auths/signin` endpoint leaked whether an email address belonged to a registered account through a response-time side channel. Password verification ran bcrypt only when the email was found in the database; for a non-existent email the request returned early without hashing. The expensive bcrypt comparison therefore made valid-account attempts respond significantly slower (~180 ms) than non-existent ones (~5 ms), so an unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts by measuring response time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On signin the backend looked the user up by email and only performed the bcrypt password comparison if a record existed. A missing email short-circuited before any hashing, producing the timing gap. The built-in brute-force throttling did not prevent it: sending one request at a time with a small delay between requests stays under the rate limit while still exposing the difference.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observed in the reporter&amp;#39;s run (HTTP 400 for every attempt, the response time is the signal):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
Email                Status   Response time
joe@example.com      400      186 ms   &amp;lt;- valid account
larry@example.com    400        9 ms
jose@example.com     400        6 ms
james@example.com    400        5 ms
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate which email addresses are registered accounts, which enables targeted password-spraying against confirmed accounts. The impact is amplified by MFA not being enabled by default. No data is read or mo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7rw5-9f7q-xj36</guid>
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