https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 09:31:13 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55390 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> koxudaxi datamodel-code-generator</p> <p>datamodel-code-generator generates Python data models from schema definitions. From 0.59.0 until 0.62.0, XML Schema parsing in src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/xmlschema.py for --input-file-type xmlschema resolves xs:include, xs:import, xs:redefine, and xs:override schemaLocation values outside the input base path, allowing arbitrary local files to be read and reflected into generated models. This issue is fixed in version 0.62.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> koxudaxi datamodel-code-generator</p> <p>datamodel-code-generator generates Python data models from schema definitions. From 0.59.0 until 0.62.0, XML Schema parsing in src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/xmlschema.py for --input-file-type xmlschema resolves xs:include, xs:import, xs:redefine, and xs:override schemaLocation values outside the input base path, allowing arbitrary local files to be read and reflected into generated models. This issue is fixed in version 0.62.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55390 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-442q-2j6p-642g <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: datamodel-code-generator</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>When generating models from an XML Schema (`--input-file-type xmlschema`), `datamodel-code-generator` resolves `&lt;xs:include&gt;`, `&lt;xs:import&gt;`, `&lt;xs:redefine&gt;`, and `&lt;xs:override&gt;` `schemaLocation` attributes against the source directory and reads the target with no restriction to the input/base directory. An attacker who controls the input XSD can read arbitrary files via `../` traversal or an absolute path, and the included schema&#39;s contents (type names, restrictions, enumerations) are folded into the generated output. Unlike the JSON-Schema `$ref` path, there is no `allow_remote_refs` control for XSD, so `--no-allow-remote-refs` does not mitigate it. This is an unauthenticated path-traversal / information-disclosure issue reachable in the default configuration.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The XSD parser walks include-style children and reads each `schemaLocation` with only an `is_file()` check (`src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/xmlschema.py`):</p> <p>```python location = (source_dir / schema_location).resolve() # .resolve() collapses ../, escapes base if location in seen or not location.is_file(): continue included_root = self._parse_schema(_read_xml_text(location, self.encoding), location) ```</p> <p>`schema_location` is attacker-controlled and `_read_xml_text` does `path.read_bytes()`. Because `(source_dir / schema_location).resolve()` normalizes `..` and accepts absolute paths, the resolved target can be any file the process can read; there is no `is_relative_to(base_path)`…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: datamodel-code-generator</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>When generating models from an XML Schema (`--input-file-type xmlschema`), `datamodel-code-generator` resolves `&lt;xs:include&gt;`, `&lt;xs:import&gt;`, `&lt;xs:redefine&gt;`, and `&lt;xs:override&gt;` `schemaLocation` attributes against the source directory and reads the target with no restriction to the input/base directory. An attacker who controls the input XSD can read arbitrary files via `../` traversal or an absolute path, and the included schema&#39;s contents (type names, restrictions, enumerations) are folded into the generated output. Unlike the JSON-Schema `$ref` path, there is no `allow_remote_refs` control for XSD, so `--no-allow-remote-refs` does not mitigate it. This is an unauthenticated path-traversal / information-disclosure issue reachable in the default configuration.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The XSD parser walks include-style children and reads each `schemaLocation` with only an `is_file()` check (`src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/xmlschema.py`):</p> <p>```python location = (source_dir / schema_location).resolve() # .resolve() collapses ../, escapes base if location in seen or not location.is_file(): continue included_root = self._parse_schema(_read_xml_text(location, self.encoding), location) ```</p> <p>`schema_location` is attacker-controlled and `_read_xml_text` does `path.read_bytes()`. Because `(source_dir / schema_location).resolve()` normalizes `..` and accepts absolute paths, the resolved target can be any file the process can read; there is no `is_relative_to(base_path)`…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-442q-2j6p-642g