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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:23:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-ansible@10-CVE-2026-69249 — python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-ansible@10-cve-2026-69249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ansible@10&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The core issue arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
    fn build_chain_inner(
        &amp;amp;self,
        working_cert: &amp;amp;VerificationCertificate&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;,
        current_depth: u8,
        working_cert_extensions: &amp;amp;Extensions&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        name_chain: NameChain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;_, &amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        budget: &amp;amp;mut Budget,
    ) -&amp;gt; ValidationResult&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, Chain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;, B&amp;gt; {
        if let Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&amp;amp;NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&amp;amp;nc.value()?, budget)?;
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Look in the store&amp;#39;s root set to see if the working cert is listed.
        // I…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: ansible@10&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The core issue arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
    fn build_chain_inner(
        &amp;amp;self,
        working_cert: &amp;amp;VerificationCertificate&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;,
        current_depth: u8,
        working_cert_extensions: &amp;amp;Extensions&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        name_chain: NameChain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;_, &amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        budget: &amp;amp;mut Budget,
    ) -&amp;gt; ValidationResult&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, Chain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;, B&amp;gt; {
        if let Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&amp;amp;NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&amp;amp;nc.value()?, budget)?;
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Look in the store&amp;#39;s root set to see if the working cert is listed.
        // I…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-ansible@10-cve-2026-69249</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-69249 — python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-69249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pyca cryptography&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;python-cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. In versions 42.0.0 through 48.0.0, when resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack. The core issue arises in the recursive nature of build_chain_inner, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates. As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability. This issue is fixed in 49.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pyca cryptography&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;python-cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. In versions 42.0.0 through 48.0.0, when resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack. The core issue arises in the recursive nature of build_chain_inner, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates. As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability. This issue is fixed in 49.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-69249</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww — python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jwv3-5hgf-82ww</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: cryptography&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The core issue arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
    fn build_chain_inner(
        &amp;amp;self,
        working_cert: &amp;amp;VerificationCertificate&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;,
        current_depth: u8,
        working_cert_extensions: &amp;amp;Extensions&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        name_chain: NameChain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;_, &amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        budget: &amp;amp;mut Budget,
    ) -&amp;gt; ValidationResult&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, Chain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;, B&amp;gt; {
        if let Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&amp;amp;NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&amp;amp;nc.value()?, budget)?;
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Look in the store&amp;#39;s root set to see if the working cert is listed.
        // I…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: cryptography&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The core issue arises in the recursive nature of `build_chain_inner`, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
    fn build_chain_inner(
        &amp;amp;self,
        working_cert: &amp;amp;VerificationCertificate&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;,
        current_depth: u8,
        working_cert_extensions: &amp;amp;Extensions&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        name_chain: NameChain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;_, &amp;#39;chain&amp;gt;,
        budget: &amp;amp;mut Budget,
    ) -&amp;gt; ValidationResult&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, Chain&amp;lt;&amp;#39;chain, B&amp;gt;, B&amp;gt; {
        if let Some(nc) = working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&amp;amp;NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
            name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&amp;amp;nc.value()?, budget)?;
        }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Look in the store&amp;#39;s root set to see if the working cert is listed.
        // I…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jwv3-5hgf-82ww</guid>
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