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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 20:27:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-57132 — PraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-57132</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.62, setting PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH to disabled makes verify_token accept requests to /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke without CALL_SERVER_TOKEN authentication. Deployments that use the application&amp;#39;s advertised opt-out can expose registered agents and their connected tools or private context to unauthenticated invocation. The vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.62.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.62, setting PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH to disabled makes verify_token accept requests to /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke without CALL_SERVER_TOKEN authentication. Deployments that use the application&amp;#39;s advertised opt-out can expose registered agents and their connected tools or private context to unauthenticated invocation. The vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.62.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-57132</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqq — PraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8ccj-p46r-jwqq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Setting `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` completely disables all authentication on the `/api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke` endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application&amp;#39;s own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py:32
_CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv(&amp;#39;PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;).lower() == &amp;#39;disabled&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;async def verify_token(...) -&amp;gt; None:
    if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED:
        return  # all authentication skipped unconditionally
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application&amp;#39;s own error message advertises the bypass:
&amp;gt; &amp;#34;Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This causes the setting to appear in Docker/Compose configurations as a convenience option.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import os
os.environ[&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH&amp;#34;] = &amp;#34;disabled&amp;#34;
# verify_token() now returns immediately for any request
# POST /api/v1/agents/any-agent/invoke → 200 OK (no token needed)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Common vulnerable deployment:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```yaml
# docker-compose.yml
environment:
  - PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled  # auth completely disabled
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Full unauthenticated access to the agent invocation API. Any agent registered on the server can be triggered without credentials, potentially executing arbitrary actions depending on the agent&amp;#39;s configured tools.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Setting `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` completely disables all authentication on the `/api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke` endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application&amp;#39;s own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py:32
_CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv(&amp;#39;PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;).lower() == &amp;#39;disabled&amp;#39;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;async def verify_token(...) -&amp;gt; None:
    if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED:
        return  # all authentication skipped unconditionally
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application&amp;#39;s own error message advertises the bypass:
&amp;gt; &amp;#34;Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication.&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This causes the setting to appear in Docker/Compose configurations as a convenience option.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import os
os.environ[&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH&amp;#34;] = &amp;#34;disabled&amp;#34;
# verify_token() now returns immediately for any request
# POST /api/v1/agents/any-agent/invoke → 200 OK (no token needed)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Common vulnerable deployment:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```yaml
# docker-compose.yml
environment:
  - PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled  # auth completely disabled
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Full unauthenticated access to the agent invocation API. Any agent registered on the server can be triggered without credentials, potentially executing arbitrary actions depending on the agent&amp;#39;s configured tools.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8ccj-p46r-jwqq</guid>
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