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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-50271 — dd-trace-py: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-50271</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; DataDog dd-trace-py&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Datadog dd-trace-py is the Datadog Python APM client. Prior to 4.8.2, Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES limits on the extract path. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against HTTP services with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.8.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; DataDog dd-trace-py&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Datadog dd-trace-py is the Datadog Python APM client. Prior to 4.8.2, Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES limits on the extract path. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against HTTP services with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 4.8.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-50271</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-mw54-j2v2-42hr — dd-trace-py: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mw54-j2v2-42hr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ddtrace&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled.
The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
This is resolved in version 4.8.2 and later of the `dd-trace-py` library&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently).
2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources
Related upstream…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ddtrace&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled.
The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
This is resolved in version 4.8.2 and later of the `dd-trace-py` library&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently).
2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Resources
Related upstream…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mw54-j2v2-42hr</guid>
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