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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 06:03:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-56259 — Crawl4AI - LLM Credential Exfiltration via base_url and Environment Variable Resolution</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-56259</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Crawl4AI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Crawl4AI before 0.8.8 contains credential exfiltration vulnerabilities in the Docker API server that allow attackers to redirect LLM API calls to attacker-controlled endpoints and read arbitrary environment variables. Attackers can exploit the unauthenticated /md, /llm, and /llm/job endpoints by supplying a malicious base_url parameter and setting api_token to env:VARIABLE_NAME to exfiltrate provider API keys and server secrets including JWT SECRET_KEY for authentication bypass.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Crawl4AI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Crawl4AI before 0.8.8 contains credential exfiltration vulnerabilities in the Docker API server that allow attackers to redirect LLM API calls to attacker-controlled endpoints and read arbitrary environment variables. Attackers can exploit the unauthenticated /md, /llm, and /llm/job endpoints by supplying a malicious base_url parameter and setting api_token to env:VARIABLE_NAME to exfiltrate provider API keys and server secrets including JWT SECRET_KEY for authentication bypass.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-56259</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq — Crawl4AI: LLM credential exfiltration in Docker server via request base_url and env: token resolution</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f989-c77f-r2cq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Docker API server let a request control where LLM calls were sent and which environment variable an LLM token resolved from. Both could be abused to exfiltrate server-held secrets. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vector 1 - attacker base_url&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`/md`, `/llm`, and `/llm/job` accepted a `base_url` in the request and used it as the LLM endpoint while still attaching the server&amp;#39;s configured provider API key. An attacker set `base_url` to a server they control and received the provider key (and any provider keys the server holds) in the inbound request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vector 2 - arbitrary environment variable read via `env:`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`LLMConfig(api_token=&amp;#34;env:NAME&amp;#34;)` resolved `NAME` from the server environment with `os.getenv`. Because request bodies were deserialized into `LLMConfig` (via a crawler config / extraction strategy), an attacker could set `api_token=&amp;#34;env:SECRET_KEY&amp;#34;` (or `env:REDIS_PASSWORD`, etc.) and, paired with an attacker `base_url`, exfiltrate that secret. Reading the server&amp;#39;s `SECRET_KEY` enables forging authentication tokens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Disclosure of LLM provider API keys and other server secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint; reading the JWT `SECRET_KEY` can lead to authentication bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- The LLM endpoints ignore a request-supplied `base_url`; the endpoint is always derived server-side from the provider name. The field is still accepted but no longer honored (no breaking 4xx).
- `LLMConfig` refuses `env:` resolution of prot…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: crawl4ai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Docker API server let a request control where LLM calls were sent and which environment variable an LLM token resolved from. Both could be abused to exfiltrate server-held secrets. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vector 1 - attacker base_url&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`/md`, `/llm`, and `/llm/job` accepted a `base_url` in the request and used it as the LLM endpoint while still attaching the server&amp;#39;s configured provider API key. An attacker set `base_url` to a server they control and received the provider key (and any provider keys the server holds) in the inbound request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vector 2 - arbitrary environment variable read via `env:`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`LLMConfig(api_token=&amp;#34;env:NAME&amp;#34;)` resolved `NAME` from the server environment with `os.getenv`. Because request bodies were deserialized into `LLMConfig` (via a crawler config / extraction strategy), an attacker could set `api_token=&amp;#34;env:SECRET_KEY&amp;#34;` (or `env:REDIS_PASSWORD`, etc.) and, paired with an attacker `base_url`, exfiltrate that secret. Reading the server&amp;#39;s `SECRET_KEY` enables forging authentication tokens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Disclosure of LLM provider API keys and other server secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint; reading the JWT `SECRET_KEY` can lead to authentication bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- The LLM endpoints ignore a request-supplied `base_url`; the endpoint is always derived server-side from the provider name. The field is still accepted but no longer honored (no breaking 4xx).
- `LLMConfig` refuses `env:` resolution of prot…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f989-c77f-r2cq</guid>
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