https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 09:15:21 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-41206 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ParzivalHack PySpector</p> <p>PySpector is a static analysis security testing (SAST) Framework engineered for modern Python development workflows. The plugin security validator in PySpector uses AST-based static analysis to prevent dangerous code from being loaded as plugins. Prior to version 0.1.8, the blocklist implemented in `PluginSecurity.validate_plugin_code` is incomplete and can be bypassed using several Python constructs that are not checked. An attacker who can supply a plugin file can achieve arbitrary code execution within the PySpector process when that plugin is installed and executed. Version 0.1.8 fixes the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ParzivalHack PySpector</p> <p>PySpector is a static analysis security testing (SAST) Framework engineered for modern Python development workflows. The plugin security validator in PySpector uses AST-based static analysis to prevent dangerous code from being loaded as plugins. Prior to version 0.1.8, the blocklist implemented in `PluginSecurity.validate_plugin_code` is incomplete and can be bypassed using several Python constructs that are not checked. An attacker who can supply a plugin file can achieve arbitrary code execution within the PySpector process when that plugin is installed and executed. Version 0.1.8 fixes the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-41206 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vp22-38m5-r39r <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyspector</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The plugin security validator in PySpector uses AST-based static analysis to prevent dangerous code from being loaded as plugins. The blocklist implemented in `PluginSecurity.validate_plugin_code` is incomplete and can be bypassed using several Python constructs that are not checked. An attacker who can supply a plugin file can achieve arbitrary code execution within the PySpector process when that plugin is installed and executed.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The validator maintains a set called `fatal_calls` that enumerates explicitly forbidden function names and attribute access patterns such as eval, exec, `os.system`, and `subprocess.Popen`. However, this approach relies on an exhaustive blocklist of known-dangerous identifiers, which is inherently incomplete.</p> <p>The following bypass techniques are not detected by the current implementation:</p> <p>`importlib.import_module` is not in `fatal_calls` and is not treated as a dangerous module, so it can be used to load os, subprocess, or any other module at runtime without triggering the validator.</p> <p>Dynamic attribute chains using `__class__.__mro__` and related dunder attributes allow traversal of the class hierarchy to reach arbitrary built-in functions without naming them directly in the source.</p> <p>ctypes is not blocked and can be used to call native library functions including system.</p> <p>`__builtins__` dictionary access exposes all built-in callables without using the names that the validator checks.</p> <p>`types.CodeType` allows constructi…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyspector</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The plugin security validator in PySpector uses AST-based static analysis to prevent dangerous code from being loaded as plugins. The blocklist implemented in `PluginSecurity.validate_plugin_code` is incomplete and can be bypassed using several Python constructs that are not checked. An attacker who can supply a plugin file can achieve arbitrary code execution within the PySpector process when that plugin is installed and executed.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The validator maintains a set called `fatal_calls` that enumerates explicitly forbidden function names and attribute access patterns such as eval, exec, `os.system`, and `subprocess.Popen`. However, this approach relies on an exhaustive blocklist of known-dangerous identifiers, which is inherently incomplete.</p> <p>The following bypass techniques are not detected by the current implementation:</p> <p>`importlib.import_module` is not in `fatal_calls` and is not treated as a dangerous module, so it can be used to load os, subprocess, or any other module at runtime without triggering the validator.</p> <p>Dynamic attribute chains using `__class__.__mro__` and related dunder attributes allow traversal of the class hierarchy to reach arbitrary built-in functions without naming them directly in the source.</p> <p>ctypes is not blocked and can be used to call native library functions including system.</p> <p>`__builtins__` dictionary access exposes all built-in callables without using the names that the validator checks.</p> <p>`types.CodeType` allows constructi…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vp22-38m5-r39r