https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 03:11:31 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-oterm-cve-2026-46678 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: oterm</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64). Dual-stack and translated networks route the IPv6 wrapper to the underlying IPv4 endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials.</p> <p>This is an incomplete fix of [GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3) / [CVE-2026-25580](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580). The parent advisory&#39;s remediation guaranteed that &#34;cloud metadata endpoints are always blocked, even with `allow-local`.&#34; That guarantee did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>Same impact metrics as the parent CVE, but materially narrower attack surface (AC:H instead of AC:L), because exploitation requires the application to have opted into `allow-local` on a URL influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>## Who Is Affected</p> <p>Applications are affected **only if** they explicitly opt for `FileUrl` (`ImageUrl`, `AudioUrl`, `VideoUrl`, `DocumentUrl`) into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` on a URL that is, or could be, influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>Applications are **not** affected if they use any of the bundled integrations to ingest user input, because they do not propagate `force_download` from external data:</p> <p>- `Agent.to_web` / `clai we…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: oterm</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64). Dual-stack and translated networks route the IPv6 wrapper to the underlying IPv4 endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials.</p> <p>This is an incomplete fix of [GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3) / [CVE-2026-25580](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580). The parent advisory&#39;s remediation guaranteed that &#34;cloud metadata endpoints are always blocked, even with `allow-local`.&#34; That guarantee did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>Same impact metrics as the parent CVE, but materially narrower attack surface (AC:H instead of AC:L), because exploitation requires the application to have opted into `allow-local` on a URL influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>## Who Is Affected</p> <p>Applications are affected **only if** they explicitly opt for `FileUrl` (`ImageUrl`, `AudioUrl`, `VideoUrl`, `DocumentUrl`) into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` on a URL that is, or could be, influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>Applications are **not** affected if they use any of the bundled integrations to ingest user input, because they do not propagate `force_download` from external data:</p> <p>- `Agent.to_web` / `clai we…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-oterm-cve-2026-46678 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46678 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> pydantic-ai, pydantic-ai-slim</p> <p>Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building Generative AI applications. In versions 1.56.0 through 1.98.0, when an application opts a URL into force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39; (disabling the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64), exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials on dual-stack or translated networks. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3 / CVE-2026-25580, whose remediation did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs. An application is affected only if it explicitly opts a FileUrl (ImageUrl, AudioUrl, VideoUrl, DocumentUrl) into force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39; on a URL influenced by untrusted input; it is not affected when using bundled integrations to ingest user input (Agent.to_web / clai web, VercelAIAdapter, AGUIAdapter / Agent.to_ag_ui), since they do not propagate force_download from external data, nor when downloading only from developer-controlled URLs. This issue has been fixed in version 1.99.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> pydantic-ai, pydantic-ai-slim</p> <p>Pydantic AI is a Python agent framework for building Generative AI applications. In versions 1.56.0 through 1.98.0, when an application opts a URL into force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39; (disabling the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64), exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials on dual-stack or translated networks. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3 / CVE-2026-25580, whose remediation did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs. An application is affected only if it explicitly opts a FileUrl (ImageUrl, AudioUrl, VideoUrl, DocumentUrl) into force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39; on a URL influenced by untrusted input; it is not affected when using bundled integrations to ingest user input (Agent.to_web / clai web, VercelAIAdapter, AGUIAdapter / Agent.to_ag_ui), since they do not propagate force_download from external data, nor when downloading only from developer-controlled URLs. This issue has been fixed in version 1.99.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46678 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pydantic-ai, PyPI: pydantic-ai-slim</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64). Dual-stack and translated networks route the IPv6 wrapper to the underlying IPv4 endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials.</p> <p>This is an incomplete fix of [GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3) / [CVE-2026-25580](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580). The parent advisory&#39;s remediation guaranteed that &#34;cloud metadata endpoints are always blocked, even with `allow-local`.&#34; That guarantee did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>Same impact metrics as the parent CVE, but materially narrower attack surface (AC:H instead of AC:L), because exploitation requires the application to have opted into `allow-local` on a URL influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>## Who Is Affected</p> <p>Applications are affected **only if** they explicitly opt for `FileUrl` (`ImageUrl`, `AudioUrl`, `VideoUrl`, `DocumentUrl`) into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` on a URL that is, or could be, influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>Applications are **not** affected if they use any of the bundled integrations to ingest user input, because they do not propagate `force_download` from external data:</p> <p>- `Agent.to_web` / `clai we…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pydantic-ai, PyPI: pydantic-ai-slim</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs), the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form (IPv4-mapped IPv6, 6to4, or NAT64). Dual-stack and translated networks route the IPv6 wrapper to the underlying IPv4 endpoint, exposing cloud IAM short-term credentials.</p> <p>This is an incomplete fix of [GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-2jrp-274c-jhv3) / [CVE-2026-25580](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25580). The parent advisory&#39;s remediation guaranteed that &#34;cloud metadata endpoints are always blocked, even with `allow-local`.&#34; That guarantee did not hold for IPv6-encoded forms of the metadata IPs.</p> <p>## Severity</p> <p>Same impact metrics as the parent CVE, but materially narrower attack surface (AC:H instead of AC:L), because exploitation requires the application to have opted into `allow-local` on a URL influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>## Who Is Affected</p> <p>Applications are affected **only if** they explicitly opt for `FileUrl` (`ImageUrl`, `AudioUrl`, `VideoUrl`, `DocumentUrl`) into `force_download=&#39;allow-local&#39;` on a URL that is, or could be, influenced by untrusted input.</p> <p>Applications are **not** affected if they use any of the bundled integrations to ingest user input, because they do not propagate `force_download` from external data:</p> <p>- `Agent.to_web` / `clai we…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3