https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 10 Oct 2026 03:51:04 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47409 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison praisonai-platform</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no &#34;cannot remove last owner&#34; guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison praisonai-platform</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no &#34;cannot remove last owner&#34; guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47409 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w388-2392-px73 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no &#34;cannot remove last owner&#34; guard. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140; `services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78. **Root cause:** `MemberService.remove(workspace_id, user_id)` performs the deletion without any caller-permission check or owner-protection logic. The route accepts the URL-supplied `user_id` and dispatches it straight through. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is implemented but never invoked here. A member-tier attacker can issue `DELETE .../members/&lt;owner_user_id&gt;` and immediately lock the legitimate owner out of the workspace.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140.</p> <p>```python @router.delete(&#34;/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}&#34;, status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT) async def remove_member( workspace_id: str, user_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&#34;member&#34; session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): member_svc = MemberService(session) removed = await membe…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no &#34;cannot remove last owner&#34; guard. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140; `services/member_service.py`, lines 71-78. **Root cause:** `MemberService.remove(workspace_id, user_id)` performs the deletion without any caller-permission check or owner-protection logic. The route accepts the URL-supplied `user_id` and dispatches it straight through. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is implemented but never invoked here. A member-tier attacker can issue `DELETE .../members/&lt;owner_user_id&gt;` and immediately lock the legitimate owner out of the workspace.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 130-140.</p> <p>```python @router.delete(&#34;/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}&#34;, status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT) async def remove_member( workspace_id: str, user_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&#34;member&#34; session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): member_svc = MemberService(session) removed = await membe…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w388-2392-px73