https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 14 Oct 2026 16:03:18 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47405 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison praisonai-platform</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`. The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members. As a result, a normal workspace member can promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; change other members&#39; roles; remove legitimate owners or members; take over workspace membership completely; and/or perform destructive workspace operations after escalation. This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison praisonai-platform</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`. The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members. As a result, a normal workspace member can promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; change other members&#39; roles; remove legitimate owners or members; take over workspace membership completely; and/or perform destructive workspace operations after escalation. This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47405 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h37g-4h4p-9x97 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`.</p> <p>The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.</p> <p>As a result, a normal workspace member can:</p> <p>- promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; - add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; - change other members&#39; roles; - remove legitimate owners or members; - take over workspace membership completely; - perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.</p> <p>This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:</p> <p>```text praisonai_platform/api/deps.py ````</p> <p>The dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:</p> <p>```python async def require_workspace_member( workspace_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user), session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), min_role: str = &#34;member&#34;, ) -&gt; AuthIdentity: ... has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role) ```</p> <p>Because `min_role` defaults to `&#34;member&#34;`, any route using:</p> <p>```python Depends(require_workspace_member) ```</p> <p>without explicitly passing a stronger role only req…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`.</p> <p>The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members.</p> <p>As a result, a normal workspace member can:</p> <p>- promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; - add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; - change other members&#39; roles; - remove legitimate owners or members; - take over workspace membership completely; - perform destructive workspace operations after escalation.</p> <p>This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable authorization dependency is defined in:</p> <p>```text praisonai_platform/api/deps.py ````</p> <p>The dependency defaults to the lowest workspace role:</p> <p>```python async def require_workspace_member( workspace_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user), session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), min_role: str = &#34;member&#34;, ) -&gt; AuthIdentity: ... has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role) ```</p> <p>Because `min_role` defaults to `&#34;member&#34;`, any route using:</p> <p>```python Depends(require_workspace_member) ```</p> <p>without explicitly passing a stronger role only req…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h37g-4h4p-9x97