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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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      <title>CVE-2026-47412 — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47412</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47412</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-g8rr-7rj2-f627 — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g8rr-7rj2-f627</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86; `services/workspace_service.py`&amp;#39;s `delete()` method.
**Root cause:** the route uses `Depends(require_workspace_member)` which defaults to `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;` and is never overridden. The service method `WorkspaceService.delete(workspace_id)` performs the destructive operation without any caller-permission verification. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`, member_service.py:80-96) is implemented but unused for this endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@router.delete(&amp;#34;/{workspace_id}&amp;#34;, status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def delete_workspace(
    workspace_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # &amp;lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)
    deleted = awai…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86; `services/workspace_service.py`&amp;#39;s `delete()` method.
**Root cause:** the route uses `Depends(require_workspace_member)` which defaults to `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;` and is never overridden. The service method `WorkspaceService.delete(workspace_id)` performs the destructive operation without any caller-permission verification. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`, member_service.py:80-96) is implemented but unused for this endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@router.delete(&amp;#34;/{workspace_id}&amp;#34;, status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def delete_workspace(
    workspace_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # &amp;lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)
    deleted = awai…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-g8rr-7rj2-f627</guid>
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