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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-39308 — PraisonAI recipe registry publish path traversal allows out-of-root file write</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-39308</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle&amp;#39;s internal manifest.json before it verifies that the manifest name and version match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place ../ traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP 400. This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.113, PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle&amp;#39;s internal manifest.json before it verifies that the manifest name and version match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place ../ traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP 400. This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.113.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-39308</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r9x3-wx45-2v7f — PraisonAI recipe registry publish path traversal allows out-of-root file write</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r9x3-wx45-2v7f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle&amp;#39;s internal `manifest.json` before it verifies that the manifest `name` and `version` match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place `../` traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP `400`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is caused by the order of operations between the HTTP handler and the registry storage layer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `RegistryServer._handle_publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:370-426` parses `POST /v1/recipes/{name}/{version}`, writes the uploaded `.praison` file to a temporary path, and immediately calls:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
result = self.registry.publish(tmp_path, force=force)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` opens the uploaded tarball, reads `manifest.json`, and trusts the attacker-controlled `name` and `version` fields:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
name = manifest.get(&amp;#34;name&amp;#34;)
version = manifest.get(&amp;#34;version&amp;#34;)
recipe_dir = s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle&amp;#39;s internal `manifest.json` before it verifies that the manifest `name` and `version` match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place `../` traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP `400`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is caused by the order of operations between the HTTP handler and the registry storage layer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `RegistryServer._handle_publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:370-426` parses `POST /v1/recipes/{name}/{version}`, writes the uploaded `.praison` file to a temporary path, and immediately calls:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
result = self.registry.publish(tmp_path, force=force)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` opens the uploaded tarball, reads `manifest.json`, and trusts the attacker-controlled `name` and `version` fields:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
name = manifest.get(&amp;#34;name&amp;#34;)
version = manifest.get(&amp;#34;version&amp;#34;)
recipe_dir = s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r9x3-wx45-2v7f</guid>
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