https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 07:18:10 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40159 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP(&#34;npx -y @smithery/cli ...&#34;)). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the implementation forwards the entire parent process environment to the spawned subprocess. As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials. This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as npx -y, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP(&#34;npx -y @smithery/cli ...&#34;)). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the implementation forwards the entire parent process environment to the spawned subprocess. As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials. This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as npx -y, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40159 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., `MCP(&#34;npx -y @smithery/cli ...&#34;)`). These commands are executed through Python’s `subprocess` module. By default, the implementation **forwards the entire parent process environment** to the spawned subprocess:</p> <p>```python # src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py env = kwargs.get(&#39;env&#39;, {}) if not env: env = os.environ.copy() ```</p> <p>As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials.</p> <p>This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as `npx -y`, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets.</p> <p>## Reproducing the Attack 1. Export a secret key: `export SUPER_SECRET_KEY=123456_pwned` 2. Start an MCP tool locally that dumps its inherited environment: ```python from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP # The underlying MCP library spawns this command via subprocess and it dumps the variables mcp = MCP(&#39;python -c &#34;import os, json; print(json.dumps(dict(os.enviro…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., `MCP(&#34;npx -y @smithery/cli ...&#34;)`). These commands are executed through Python’s `subprocess` module. By default, the implementation **forwards the entire parent process environment** to the spawned subprocess:</p> <p>```python # src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py env = kwargs.get(&#39;env&#39;, {}) if not env: env = os.environ.copy() ```</p> <p>As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials.</p> <p>This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as `npx -y`, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets.</p> <p>## Reproducing the Attack 1. Export a secret key: `export SUPER_SECRET_KEY=123456_pwned` 2. Start an MCP tool locally that dumps its inherited environment: ```python from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP # The underlying MCP library spawns this command via subprocess and it dumps the variables mcp = MCP(&#39;python -c &#34;import os, json; print(json.dumps(dict(os.enviro…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq