https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 08:36:34 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40148 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the _safe_extractall() function in PraisonAI&#39;s recipe registry validates archive members against path traversal attacks but performs no checks on individual member sizes, cumulative extracted size, or member count before calling tar.extractall(). An attacker can publish a malicious recipe bundle containing highly compressible data (e.g., 10GB of zeros compressing to ~10MB) that exhausts the victim&#39;s disk when pulled via LocalRegistry.pull() or HttpRegistry.pull(). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, the _safe_extractall() function in PraisonAI&#39;s recipe registry validates archive members against path traversal attacks but performs no checks on individual member sizes, cumulative extracted size, or member count before calling tar.extractall(). An attacker can publish a malicious recipe bundle containing highly compressible data (e.g., 10GB of zeros compressing to ~10MB) that exhausts the victim&#39;s disk when pulled via LocalRegistry.pull() or HttpRegistry.pull(). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40148 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f2h6-7xfr-xm8w <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `_safe_extractall()` function in PraisonAI&#39;s recipe registry validates archive members against path traversal attacks but performs no checks on individual member sizes, cumulative extracted size, or member count before calling `tar.extractall()`. An attacker can publish a malicious recipe bundle containing highly compressible data (e.g., 10GB of zeros compressing to ~10MB) that exhausts the victim&#39;s disk when pulled via `LocalRegistry.pull()` or `HttpRegistry.pull()`.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The vulnerable function is `_safe_extractall()` at `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:131-162`:</p> <p>```python def _safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, dest_dir: Path) -&gt; None: dest_resolved = dest_dir.resolve() for member in tar.getmembers(): member_path = Path(member.name) # Reject absolute paths if member_path.is_absolute(): raise RegistryError(...) # Reject &#39;..&#39; components if &#39;..&#39; in member_path.parts: raise RegistryError(...) # Reject resolved paths escaping dest_dir resolved = (dest_resolved / member_path).resolve() if not str(resolved).startswith(str(dest_resolved) + os.sep) and resolved != dest_resolved: raise RegistryError(...) # All members validated — safe to extract tar.extractall(dest_dir) # &lt;-- No size limit ```</p> <p>The function iterates all tar members and checks for path traversal (absolute paths, `..` components, resolved path escaping), but never…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PraisonAI</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `_safe_extractall()` function in PraisonAI&#39;s recipe registry validates archive members against path traversal attacks but performs no checks on individual member sizes, cumulative extracted size, or member count before calling `tar.extractall()`. An attacker can publish a malicious recipe bundle containing highly compressible data (e.g., 10GB of zeros compressing to ~10MB) that exhausts the victim&#39;s disk when pulled via `LocalRegistry.pull()` or `HttpRegistry.pull()`.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The vulnerable function is `_safe_extractall()` at `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:131-162`:</p> <p>```python def _safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, dest_dir: Path) -&gt; None: dest_resolved = dest_dir.resolve() for member in tar.getmembers(): member_path = Path(member.name) # Reject absolute paths if member_path.is_absolute(): raise RegistryError(...) # Reject &#39;..&#39; components if &#39;..&#39; in member_path.parts: raise RegistryError(...) # Reject resolved paths escaping dest_dir resolved = (dest_resolved / member_path).resolve() if not str(resolved).startswith(str(dest_resolved) + os.sep) and resolved != dest_resolved: raise RegistryError(...) # All members validated — safe to extract tar.extractall(dest_dir) # &lt;-- No size limit ```</p> <p>The function iterates all tar members and checks for path traversal (absolute paths, `..` components, resolved path escaping), but never…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f2h6-7xfr-xm8w