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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 22:54:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53875 — picklescan - Scanning Bypass via Dynamic Eval in scan_pytorch</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53875</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; picklescan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;picklescan before 1.0.3 contains a scanning bypass vulnerability in the scan_pytorch function that allows attackers to embed malicious magic numbers via dynamic eval using the __reduce__ trick. Attackers can craft malicious PyTorch payloads that evade picklescan detection while remaining executable, enabling arbitrary code execution when loaded with torch.load().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; picklescan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;picklescan before 1.0.3 contains a scanning bypass vulnerability in the scan_pytorch function that allows attackers to embed malicious magic numbers via dynamic eval using the __reduce__ trick. Attackers can craft malicious PyTorch payloads that evade picklescan detection while remaining executable, enabling arbitrary code execution when loaded with torch.load().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53875</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2 — Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-97f8-7cmv-76j2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: picklescan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
This is a scanning bypass to `scan_pytorch` function in `picklescan`. As we can see in the implementation of [get_magic_number()](https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/src/picklescan/torch.py#L76C5-L84) that uses `pickletools.genops(data)` to get the `magic_number` with the condition `opcode.name` includes `INT` or `LONG`, but the PyTorch&amp;#39;s implemtation simply uses [pickle_module.load()](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89/torch/serialization.py#L1797) to get this `magic_number`. For this implementation difference, we then can embed the `magic_code` into the `PyTorch` file via dynamic `eval` on the `\_\_reduce\_\_` trick, which can make the `pickletools.genops(data)` cannot get the `magic_code` in `INT` or `LONG` type, but the `pickle_module.load()` can still return the same `magic_code`, eading to a bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
#### Attack Step 1
we can edit the source code of the function [\_legacy\_save()](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89/torch/serialization.py#L1120) as follows:
```Python
    class payload:
        def __reduce__(self):
            return (eval, (&amp;#39;MAGIC_NUMBER&amp;#39;,))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pickle_module.dump(payload(), f, protocol=pickle_protocol)
```
#### Attack Step 2
with the modified version of `PyTorch`, we run the following PoC to generate the `payload.pt`:
```Python
import torch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;class payload:
    def __reduce__(self):…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: picklescan&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
This is a scanning bypass to `scan_pytorch` function in `picklescan`. As we can see in the implementation of [get_magic_number()](https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/blob/2a8383cfeb4158567f9770d86597300c9e508d0f/src/picklescan/torch.py#L76C5-L84) that uses `pickletools.genops(data)` to get the `magic_number` with the condition `opcode.name` includes `INT` or `LONG`, but the PyTorch&amp;#39;s implemtation simply uses [pickle_module.load()](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89/torch/serialization.py#L1797) to get this `magic_number`. For this implementation difference, we then can embed the `magic_code` into the `PyTorch` file via dynamic `eval` on the `\_\_reduce\_\_` trick, which can make the `pickletools.genops(data)` cannot get the `magic_code` in `INT` or `LONG` type, but the `pickle_module.load()` can still return the same `magic_code`, eading to a bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
#### Attack Step 1
we can edit the source code of the function [\_legacy\_save()](https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/blob/134179474539648ba7dee1317959529fbd0e7f89/torch/serialization.py#L1120) as follows:
```Python
    class payload:
        def __reduce__(self):
            return (eval, (&amp;#39;MAGIC_NUMBER&amp;#39;,))&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pickle_module.dump(payload(), f, protocol=pickle_protocol)
```
#### Attack Step 2
with the modified version of `PyTorch`, we run the following PoC to generate the `payload.pt`:
```Python
import torch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;class payload:
    def __reduce__(self):…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-97f8-7cmv-76j2</guid>
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