https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 22:47:54 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-28786 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to version 0.8.6, an unsanitized filename field in the speech-to-text transcription endpoint allows any authenticated non-admin user to trigger a `FileNotFoundError` whose message — including the server&#39;s absolute `DATA_DIR` path — is returned verbatim in the HTTP 400 response body, confirming information disclosure on all default deployments. Version 0.8.6 patches the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to version 0.8.6, an unsanitized filename field in the speech-to-text transcription endpoint allows any authenticated non-admin user to trigger a `FileNotFoundError` whose message — including the server&#39;s absolute `DATA_DIR` path — is returned verbatim in the HTTP 400 response body, confirming information disclosure on all default deployments. Version 0.8.6 patches the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-28786 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vvxm-vxmr-624h <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>An unsanitised filename field in the speech-to-text transcription endpoint allows any authenticated non-admin user to trigger a `FileNotFoundError` whose message — including the server&#39;s absolute `DATA_DIR` path — is returned verbatim in the HTTP 400 response body, confirming information disclosure on all default deployments.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`backend/open_webui/routers/audio.py:1197` extracts a file extension from the raw multipart `filename` using `file.filename.split(&#34;.&#34;)[-1]` with no path sanitisation. The result is concatenated into a filesystem path and passed to `open()`:</p> <p>```python ext = file.filename.split(&#34;.&#34;)[-1] # attacker-controlled, no sanitisation filename = f&#34;{id}.{ext}&#34; # may contain &#34;/&#34; file_path = f&#34;{file_dir}/{filename}&#34; with open(file_path, &#34;wb&#34;) as f: f.write(contents) ```</p> <p>If the filename is `audio./etc/passwd`, `split(&#34;.&#34;)[-1]` yields `/etc/passwd` and the assembled path becomes:</p> <p>``` {CACHE_DIR}/audio/transcriptions/{uuid}./etc/passwd ```</p> <p>`open()` fails with `FileNotFoundError`. The outer `except` block at line 1231 returns the exception via `ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT(e)`, leaking the full absolute path in the response body.</p> <p>The MIME-type guard at line 1190 checks `Content-Type` (a separate multipart field) and does not constrain `filename`. Setting `Content-Type: audio/wav` satisfies the guard regardless of the filename value.</p> <p>This handler is the only file upload path in the codebase that omits `os.pat…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>An unsanitised filename field in the speech-to-text transcription endpoint allows any authenticated non-admin user to trigger a `FileNotFoundError` whose message — including the server&#39;s absolute `DATA_DIR` path — is returned verbatim in the HTTP 400 response body, confirming information disclosure on all default deployments.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>`backend/open_webui/routers/audio.py:1197` extracts a file extension from the raw multipart `filename` using `file.filename.split(&#34;.&#34;)[-1]` with no path sanitisation. The result is concatenated into a filesystem path and passed to `open()`:</p> <p>```python ext = file.filename.split(&#34;.&#34;)[-1] # attacker-controlled, no sanitisation filename = f&#34;{id}.{ext}&#34; # may contain &#34;/&#34; file_path = f&#34;{file_dir}/{filename}&#34; with open(file_path, &#34;wb&#34;) as f: f.write(contents) ```</p> <p>If the filename is `audio./etc/passwd`, `split(&#34;.&#34;)[-1]` yields `/etc/passwd` and the assembled path becomes:</p> <p>``` {CACHE_DIR}/audio/transcriptions/{uuid}./etc/passwd ```</p> <p>`open()` fails with `FileNotFoundError`. The outer `except` block at line 1231 returns the exception via `ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT(e)`, leaking the full absolute path in the response body.</p> <p>The MIME-type guard at line 1190 checks `Content-Type` (a separate multipart field) and does not constrain `filename`. Setting `Content-Type: audio/wav` satisfies the guard regardless of the filename value.</p> <p>This handler is the only file upload path in the codebase that omits `os.pat…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vvxm-vxmr-624h