https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 12 Oct 2026 07:12:40 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45401 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain&#39;s WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain&#39;s WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45401 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p># Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch, Image-Load, and Chat-Completion Endpoints</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `validate_url()` function in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` only validates the *initial* URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync `requests`, async `aiohttp`, langchain&#39;s `WebBaseLoader`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do **not** re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` endpoint, the `/api/v1/images/...` endpoints, the `/api/chat/completions` endpoint with an `image_url` content part, and any other route that calls these helpers.</p> <p>## Affected code paths</p> <p>The bypass exists across multiple call sites; each independently follows redirects without re-validation.</p> <p>### Path 1 — sync `_scrape` via `SafeWebBaseLoader`</p> <p>`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `SafeWebBaseLoader` inherits from `langchain_community.document_loaders.WebBaseLoader`. The parent&#39;s `_scrape()` calls `self.session.get(url, **self.requests_kwargs)`. `requests_kwargs` only sets `timeout`; `allow_redirects=False` is **not** passed, so `requests.Session.get()` follows redirects with the default `allow_redirects=True`. `validate_url()` is invoked once on the…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p># Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Bypass via HTTP Redirect Following in Web-Fetch, Image-Load, and Chat-Completion Endpoints</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The `validate_url()` function in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` only validates the *initial* URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync `requests`, async `aiohttp`, langchain&#39;s `WebBaseLoader`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do **not** re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. `127.0.0.1`, `169.254.169.254`, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web` endpoint, the `/api/v1/images/...` endpoints, the `/api/chat/completions` endpoint with an `image_url` content part, and any other route that calls these helpers.</p> <p>## Affected code paths</p> <p>The bypass exists across multiple call sites; each independently follows redirects without re-validation.</p> <p>### Path 1 — sync `_scrape` via `SafeWebBaseLoader`</p> <p>`backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` — `SafeWebBaseLoader` inherits from `langchain_community.document_loaders.WebBaseLoader`. The parent&#39;s `_scrape()` calls `self.session.get(url, **self.requests_kwargs)`. `requests_kwargs` only sets `timeout`; `allow_redirects=False` is **not** passed, so `requests.Session.get()` follows redirects with the default `allow_redirects=True`. `validate_url()` is invoked once on the…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6