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      <title>CVE-2026-45315 — Open WebUI: Stored XSS via attacker-controlled file extension in /api/v1/audio/transcriptions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45315</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, the audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/.. The /cache/{path} route serves these files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; runs in the Open WebUI origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, the audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/.. The /cache/{path} route serves these files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; runs in the Open WebUI origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45315</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m8f9-9whg-f4xr — Open WebUI has stored XSS via attacker-controlled file extension in /api/v1/audio/transcriptions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m8f9-9whg-f4xr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/&amp;lt;uuid&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ext&amp;gt;. The /cache/{path} route serves these files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; runs in the Open WebUI origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
  Verified on main @ 8dae237a (v0.9.2):                                                                                                       
  - backend/open_webui/routers/audio.py:1244-1249 — ext = safe_name.rsplit(&amp;#39;.&amp;#39;, 1)[-1] from user-supplied filename, then filename = f&amp;#39;{id}.{ext}&amp;#39;. No      
  allowlist, no cross-check against file.content_type.                                                                                                   
  - backend/open_webui/main.py:2768-2779 — /cache/{path:path} returns FileResponse(file_path). Starlette derives Content-Type from the filename extension  
  and sets no Content-Disposition.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/&amp;lt;uuid&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ext&amp;gt;. The /cache/{path} route serves these files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; runs in the Open WebUI origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
  Verified on main @ 8dae237a (v0.9.2):                                                                                                       
  - backend/open_webui/routers/audio.py:1244-1249 — ext = safe_name.rsplit(&amp;#39;.&amp;#39;, 1)[-1] from user-supplied filename, then filename = f&amp;#39;{id}.{ext}&amp;#39;. No      
  allowlist, no cross-check against file.content_type.                                                                                                   
  - backend/open_webui/main.py:2768-2779 — /cache/{path:path} returns FileResponse(file_path). Starlette derives Content-Type from the filename extension  
  and sets no Content-Disposition.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m8f9-9whg-f4xr</guid>
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