https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 16 Oct 2026 22:19:56 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45338 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p> <p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45338 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-24c9-2m8q-qhmh <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `_process_picture_url()` in `backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py` (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth `picture` claims without applying `validate_url()`, allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response.</p> <p>## Vulnerable Code ```python # backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py, line ~1337-1345 async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -&gt; str: # No validate_url() call here async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session: async with session.get(picture_url, **get_kwargs, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as resp: if resp.ok: picture = await resp.read() base64_encoded_picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode(&#39;utf-8&#39;) return f&#39;data:{guessed_mime_type};base64,{base64_encoded_picture}&#39; ```</p> <p>The codebase already uses `validate_url()` for the same SSRF protection pattern in other paths: - `backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:38` - `validate_url(url)` before `requests.get(url)` - `backend/open_webui/routers/images.py:800` - `validate_url(data)` before `requests.get(data)`</p> <p>The omission in `_process_picture_url()` is inconsistent with the project&#39;s own security practices.</p> <p>## Affected Code Paths</p> <p>1. **New user OAuth signup** (line ~1556): `picture_url = await self._process_picture_url(picture_url, token.get(…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `_process_picture_url()` in `backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py` (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth `picture` claims without applying `validate_url()`, allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response.</p> <p>## Vulnerable Code ```python # backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py, line ~1337-1345 async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -&gt; str: # No validate_url() call here async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session: async with session.get(picture_url, **get_kwargs, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as resp: if resp.ok: picture = await resp.read() base64_encoded_picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode(&#39;utf-8&#39;) return f&#39;data:{guessed_mime_type};base64,{base64_encoded_picture}&#39; ```</p> <p>The codebase already uses `validate_url()` for the same SSRF protection pattern in other paths: - `backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:38` - `validate_url(url)` before `requests.get(url)` - `backend/open_webui/routers/images.py:800` - `validate_url(data)` before `requests.get(data)`</p> <p>The omission in `_process_picture_url()` is inconsistent with the project&#39;s own security practices.</p> <p>## Affected Code Paths</p> <p>1. **New user OAuth signup** (line ~1556): `picture_url = await self._process_picture_url(picture_url, token.get(…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-24c9-2m8q-qhmh