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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 20:53:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53759 — linuxfabrik-lib: Insecure creation of SQLite databases</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53759</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linuxfabrik monitoring-plugins&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;linuxfabrik-lib provides Python modules for database access, caching, shell execution, and API integrations. Prior to version 4.2.0, db_sqlite.py created SQLite databases at predictable paths in the shared /tmp directory and followed attacker-created symbolic links at those paths. An attacker who controls a local monitoring account can create a symlink such as /tmp/linuxfabrik-monitoring-plugins-docker-stats.db and then trigger a sudo-authorized plugin, causing the root process to create or modify the symlink target. The primitive can overwrite arbitrary paths, cause denial of service, or manipulate an existing SQLite database through a crafted rollback journal or write-ahead log. The Monitoring Plugins integration also moved plugin caches through lib.db_sqlite.get_db_path() so they use the secured per-user directory. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linuxfabrik monitoring-plugins&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;linuxfabrik-lib provides Python modules for database access, caching, shell execution, and API integrations. Prior to version 4.2.0, db_sqlite.py created SQLite databases at predictable paths in the shared /tmp directory and followed attacker-created symbolic links at those paths. An attacker who controls a local monitoring account can create a symlink such as /tmp/linuxfabrik-monitoring-plugins-docker-stats.db and then trigger a sudo-authorized plugin, causing the root process to create or modify the symlink target. The primitive can overwrite arbitrary paths, cause denial of service, or manipulate an existing SQLite database through a crafted rollback journal or write-ahead log. The Monitoring Plugins integration also moved plugin caches through lib.db_sqlite.get_db_path() so they use the secured per-user directory. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-53759</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r35r-fpx2-jgr4 — Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins allow insecure creation of SQLite databases</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r35r-fpx2-jgr4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The SQLite databases are created at predictable (static) paths in `/tmp`. Any user can therefore create a symlink at these paths in /tmp pointing to arbitrary files. The monitoring scripts then follows these symlinks and then creates their database at the symlink target.
This becomes really dangerous for the scripts which can be executed as root with sudo. With this, an attacker can write to abitrary paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The docker-stats check command here as an example. Because writing to /tmp is the default behaviour, the other check commands which use a SQLite database are also very likely affected.
```
# Create the symlink as nagios user
nagios@test-server:/tmp$ ln -s /root/nagios-was-here /tmp/linuxfabrik-monitoring-plugins-docker-stats.db
# Trigger the execution nagios user
nagios@test-server:/tmp$ sudo /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/docker-stats
```
Check whether or not file was created.
```
root@test-server:/# file /root/nagios-was-here
/root/nagios-was-here: SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3046001, file counter 2, database pages 3, cookie 0x2, schema 4, UTF-8, version-valid-for 2
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
In it&amp;#39;s basic form, this vulnerbility can lead to a denial of service, impacting users who use the provided sudoers file and who didn&amp;#39;t take any special precautions like systemd&amp;#39;s `PrivateTemp`. It requires that an attacker already compromised the nagios account (which is quite a high barrier to be honest).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If any application on the server relies on…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The SQLite databases are created at predictable (static) paths in `/tmp`. Any user can therefore create a symlink at these paths in /tmp pointing to arbitrary files. The monitoring scripts then follows these symlinks and then creates their database at the symlink target.
This becomes really dangerous for the scripts which can be executed as root with sudo. With this, an attacker can write to abitrary paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
The docker-stats check command here as an example. Because writing to /tmp is the default behaviour, the other check commands which use a SQLite database are also very likely affected.
```
# Create the symlink as nagios user
nagios@test-server:/tmp$ ln -s /root/nagios-was-here /tmp/linuxfabrik-monitoring-plugins-docker-stats.db
# Trigger the execution nagios user
nagios@test-server:/tmp$ sudo /usr/lib64/nagios/plugins/docker-stats
```
Check whether or not file was created.
```
root@test-server:/# file /root/nagios-was-here
/root/nagios-was-here: SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3046001, file counter 2, database pages 3, cookie 0x2, schema 4, UTF-8, version-valid-for 2
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
In it&amp;#39;s basic form, this vulnerbility can lead to a denial of service, impacting users who use the provided sudoers file and who didn&amp;#39;t take any special precautions like systemd&amp;#39;s `PrivateTemp`. It requires that an attacker already compromised the nagios account (which is quite a high barrier to be honest).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If any application on the server relies on…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r35r-fpx2-jgr4</guid>
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