https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 05:19:36 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-42557 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: jupyterlab</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-jupyterlab-cve-2026-42557 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42557 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jupyterlab, jupyter notebook, Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.2, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)</p> <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jupyterlab, jupyter notebook, Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.2, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)</p> <p>jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. Prior to 4.5.7, JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists data-commandlinker-command and data-commandlinker-args on button elements, while CommandLinker listens for all click events on document.body and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42557 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab, PyPI: notebook</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: jupyterlab, PyPI: notebook</p> <p>JupyterLab&#39;s HTML sanitizer allowlists `data-commandlinker-command` and `data-commandlinker-args` on `button` elements, while `CommandLinker` listens for all click events on `document.body` and executes the named command without checking whether the element came from trusted JupyterLab UI. A notebook with a pre-saved HTML cell output containing a deceptive button can trigger arbitrary JupyterLab commands - including arbitrary code execution - on a single user click, without any code being submitted for execution by the user.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who shares a notebook or a Markdown file - via email, GitHub, or a Binder link - can invoke an arbitrary command upon a single click by the victim. The button can be rendered inside the output area and be visually indistinguishable from a legitimate widget. No kernel needs to start; the HTML output is stored in the notebook file and displayed immediately on open.</p> <p>#### Single-click impact</p> <p>An attacker convincing the victim to click on a single button or link can: - execute arbitrary code in the available kernels, - delete files leading to information loss; in principle the loss could be unrecoverable, depending on server configuration and attack complexity, - open multiple kernels/terminals at once, or create multiple files at once, putting significant stress on the server and thus deny availability for other users when using standalone multi-tenant jupyter-server deployment, and to a lesser degree impact availability on JupyterH…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mqcg-5x36-vfcg