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      <title>BREW-glances-CVE-2026-46606 — Glances: Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-glances-cve-2026-46606</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, the Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py) passes VM domain names, read directly from virsh list --all output, into f-string command templates that are processed by secure_popen(). secure_popen() is explicitly designed to interpret &amp;amp;&amp;amp;, |, and &amp;gt; as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, the Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py) passes VM domain names, read directly from virsh list --all output, into f-string command templates that are processed by secure_popen(). secure_popen() is explicitly designed to interpret &amp;amp;&amp;amp;, |, and &amp;gt; as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-glances-cve-2026-46606</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-46606 — Glances: Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46606</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nicolargo glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, the Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py) passes VM domain names, read directly from virsh list --all output, into f-string command templates that are processed by secure_popen(). secure_popen() is explicitly designed to interpret &amp;amp;&amp;amp;, |, and &amp;gt; as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nicolargo glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, the Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py) passes VM domain names, read directly from virsh list --all output, into f-string command templates that are processed by secure_popen(). secure_popen() is explicitly designed to interpret &amp;amp;&amp;amp;, |, and &amp;gt; as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46606</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5 — Glances is Vulnerable to Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v5r2-qh84-fjx5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `&amp;amp;&amp;amp;`, `|`, and `&amp;gt;` as shell operators.  Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# line 185  (update_stats)
ret_cmd = secure_popen(f&amp;#39;{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# line 204  (update_title)
ret_cmd = secure_popen(f&amp;#39;{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}&amp;#39;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at  any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`.  It explicitly splits…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `&amp;amp;&amp;amp;`, `|`, and `&amp;gt;` as shell operators.  Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# line 185  (update_stats)
ret_cmd = secure_popen(f&amp;#39;{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# line 204  (update_title)
ret_cmd = secure_popen(f&amp;#39;{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}&amp;#39;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59–78 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at  any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`.  It explicitly splits…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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