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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-40320 — Giskard has an Unsandboxed Jinja2 Template Rendering in ConformityCheck</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40320</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Giskard-AI giskard-oss&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Giskard is an open-source testing framework for AI models. In versions prior to 1.0.2b1, the ConformityCheck class rendered the rule parameter through Jinja2&amp;#39;s default Template() constructor, silently interpreting template expressions at runtime. If check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source, a crafted rule string could achieve arbitrary code execution. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite. This issue has been fixed in giskard-checks version 1.0.2b1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Giskard-AI giskard-oss&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Giskard is an open-source testing framework for AI models. In versions prior to 1.0.2b1, the ConformityCheck class rendered the rule parameter through Jinja2&amp;#39;s default Template() constructor, silently interpreting template expressions at runtime. If check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source, a crafted rule string could achieve arbitrary code execution. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite. This issue has been fixed in giskard-checks version 1.0.2b1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-40320</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7xjm-g8f4-rp26 — Giskard has Unsandboxed Jinja2 Template Rendering in ConformityCheck</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7xjm-g8f4-rp26</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: giskard-checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
 
The `ConformityCheck` class in `giskard-checks` rendered the `rule` parameter through Jinja2&amp;#39;s default `Template()` constructor. Because the `rule` string is silently interpreted as a Jinja2 template, a developer may not realize that template expressions embedded in rule definitions are evaluated at runtime. In a scenario where check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source (e.g. a shared project file or externally contributed configuration), this could lead to arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`giskard-checks` is a local developer testing library with no network-facing service. Check definitions, including the `rule` parameter, are provided in application code or project configuration files and executed locally. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite by a developer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the implicit template evaluation of the `rule` parameter is not obvious from the API surface. This hidden behavior increases the likelihood of a developer inadvertently passing untrusted input to it when integrating the library into a larger system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component
 
`conformity.py`, line 59:
```python
from jinja2 import Template
...
formatted_rule = Template(self.rule).render(trace=trace)
```
 
## Affected Versions
 
`giskard-checks` &amp;lt; 1.0.2b1
 
## Patched Version
 
`giskard-checks` &amp;gt;= **1.0.2b1** (template parsing removed from rule evaluation entirely)
 
## Remediation
 
Upgrade to `giskard-checks` &amp;gt;= 1.0.2b1. The templ…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: giskard-checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
 
The `ConformityCheck` class in `giskard-checks` rendered the `rule` parameter through Jinja2&amp;#39;s default `Template()` constructor. Because the `rule` string is silently interpreted as a Jinja2 template, a developer may not realize that template expressions embedded in rule definitions are evaluated at runtime. In a scenario where check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source (e.g. a shared project file or externally contributed configuration), this could lead to arbitrary code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`giskard-checks` is a local developer testing library with no network-facing service. Check definitions, including the `rule` parameter, are provided in application code or project configuration files and executed locally. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite by a developer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the implicit template evaluation of the `rule` parameter is not obvious from the API surface. This hidden behavior increases the likelihood of a developer inadvertently passing untrusted input to it when integrating the library into a larger system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Component
 
`conformity.py`, line 59:
```python
from jinja2 import Template
...
formatted_rule = Template(self.rule).render(trace=trace)
```
 
## Affected Versions
 
`giskard-checks` &amp;lt; 1.0.2b1
 
## Patched Version
 
`giskard-checks` &amp;gt;= **1.0.2b1** (template parsing removed from rule evaluation entirely)
 
## Remediation
 
Upgrade to `giskard-checks` &amp;gt;= 1.0.2b1. The templ…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7xjm-g8f4-rp26</guid>
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