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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 20:56:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-44520 — Docling-Graph: SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44520</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; docling-project docling-graph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Docling-Graph turns documents into validated Pydantic objects, then builds a directed knowledge graph with explicit semantic relationships. Prior to 1.5.1, the URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL. An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; docling-project docling-graph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Docling-Graph turns documents into validated Pydantic objects, then builds a directed knowledge graph with explicit semantic relationships. Prior to 1.5.1, the URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL. An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44520</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx — docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fqph-j6v6-jvgx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: docling-graph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `URLInputHandler` class in `docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py` makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The `URLValidator` only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty `netloc`, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, `requests.head()` was called with `allow_redirects=True`, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can control the `--source` CLI argument or `PipelineConfig.source` API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:
- Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) to steal IAM credentials
- Internal services on loopback (`127.0.0.1`) or private network ranges (`10.x`, `172.16.x`, `192.168.x`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects deployments where `docling-graph` processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is fixed in **v1.5.1**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users should upgrade immediately:
```
pip install --upgrade docling-graph
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix adds IP validation via `ipaddress` and `socket.gethostbyname()` before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (`allow_redirects=False`) with explicit validation of any `Location` header before following it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that **all URLs passed to `URLInputHandl…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: docling-graph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `URLInputHandler` class in `docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py` makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The `URLValidator` only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty `netloc`, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, `requests.head()` was called with `allow_redirects=True`, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can control the `--source` CLI argument or `PipelineConfig.source` API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:
- Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) to steal IAM credentials
- Internal services on loopback (`127.0.0.1`) or private network ranges (`10.x`, `172.16.x`, `192.168.x`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects deployments where `docling-graph` processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is fixed in **v1.5.1**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users should upgrade immediately:
```
pip install --upgrade docling-graph
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix adds IP validation via `ipaddress` and `socket.gethostbyname()` before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (`allow_redirects=False`) with explicit validation of any `Location` header before following it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that **all URLs passed to `URLInputHandl…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fqph-j6v6-jvgx</guid>
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