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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-44504 — Aegra: Cross-user run injection in /threads/{thread_id}/runs (IDOR)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44504</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; aegra&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aegra is a drop-in replacement for LangSmith Deployments. Prior to 0.9.7, with multiple authenticated users on a shared instance are vulnerable to a cross-tenant IDOR. Any authenticated attacker, given another user&amp;#39;s thread_id, can execute graph runs against the user&amp;#39;s thread, read the user&amp;#39;s full checkpoint state, and inject arbitrary messages into the user&amp;#39;s conversation history. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; aegra&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aegra is a drop-in replacement for LangSmith Deployments. Prior to 0.9.7, with multiple authenticated users on a shared instance are vulnerable to a cross-tenant IDOR. Any authenticated attacker, given another user&amp;#39;s thread_id, can execute graph runs against the user&amp;#39;s thread, read the user&amp;#39;s full checkpoint state, and inject arbitrary messages into the user&amp;#39;s conversation history. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44504</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m98r-6667-4wq7 — Aegra has cross-user run injection in /threads/{thread_id}/runs (IDOR)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m98r-6667-4wq7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: aegra-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aegra deployments running 0.9.0 through 0.9.6 with multiple authenticated users on a shared instance are vulnerable to a cross-tenant IDOR. Any authenticated user (User A), given another user&amp;#39;s `thread_id` (User B), can:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Execute graph runs against User B&amp;#39;s thread via `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs`, `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream`, or `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/wait`
- Read User B&amp;#39;s full checkpoint state via the resulting run&amp;#39;s `output` field
- Inject arbitrary messages into User B&amp;#39;s conversation history (persisted in B&amp;#39;s checkpoint)
- Hide their activity from User B&amp;#39;s `GET /threads/{thread_id}/runs` listing because the run carries A&amp;#39;s `user_id`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The streaming variant is worse — the first SSE `event: values` frame returns the entire prior `messages` array immediately on connection, no graph execution needed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread IDs are UUIDs but leak through frontend URLs, server logs, observability traces, and shared links. Guessing is not required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **0.9.7**. The three affected endpoints now perform an SQL-level `user_id == authenticated_user.identity` check before calling `_prepare_run`. When the thread exists but is owned by another user, the response is `404 Thread not found` (matching the read-side pattern) to avoid leaking thread existence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrade is not immediately possible, register an `@auth.on(&amp;#34;threads&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;create_run&amp;#34;)` handler that explicitly verifies thread ownership against the authenticated identity bef…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: aegra-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aegra deployments running 0.9.0 through 0.9.6 with multiple authenticated users on a shared instance are vulnerable to a cross-tenant IDOR. Any authenticated user (User A), given another user&amp;#39;s `thread_id` (User B), can:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Execute graph runs against User B&amp;#39;s thread via `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs`, `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/stream`, or `POST /threads/{thread_id}/runs/wait`
- Read User B&amp;#39;s full checkpoint state via the resulting run&amp;#39;s `output` field
- Inject arbitrary messages into User B&amp;#39;s conversation history (persisted in B&amp;#39;s checkpoint)
- Hide their activity from User B&amp;#39;s `GET /threads/{thread_id}/runs` listing because the run carries A&amp;#39;s `user_id`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The streaming variant is worse — the first SSE `event: values` frame returns the entire prior `messages` array immediately on connection, no graph execution needed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thread IDs are UUIDs but leak through frontend URLs, server logs, observability traces, and shared links. Guessing is not required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **0.9.7**. The three affected endpoints now perform an SQL-level `user_id == authenticated_user.identity` check before calling `_prepare_run`. When the thread exists but is owned by another user, the response is `404 Thread not found` (matching the read-side pattern) to avoid leaking thread existence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrade is not immediately possible, register an `@auth.on(&amp;#34;threads&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;create_run&amp;#34;)` handler that explicitly verifies thread ownership against the authenticated identity bef…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m98r-6667-4wq7</guid>
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