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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-34756 — vLLM Affected by Unauthenticated OOM Denial of Service via Unbounded `n` Parameter in OpenAI API Server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34756</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; vllm-project vllm, Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2, Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.4, Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI 3.4, Red Hat AI Inference Server, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From 0.1.0 to before 0.19.0, a Denial of Service vulnerability exists in the vLLM OpenAI-compatible API server. Due to the lack of an upper bound validation on the n parameter in the ChatCompletionRequest and CompletionRequest Pydantic models, an unauthenticated attacker can send a single HTTP request with an astronomically large n value. This completely blocks the Python asyncio event loop and causes immediate Out-Of-Memory crashes by allocating millions of request object copies in the heap before the request even reaches the scheduling queue. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; vllm-project vllm, Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2, Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.4, Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI 3.4, Red Hat AI Inference Server, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). From 0.1.0 to before 0.19.0, a Denial of Service vulnerability exists in the vLLM OpenAI-compatible API server. Due to the lack of an upper bound validation on the n parameter in the ChatCompletionRequest and CompletionRequest Pydantic models, an unauthenticated attacker can send a single HTTP request with an astronomically large n value. This completely blocks the Python asyncio event loop and causes immediate Out-Of-Memory crashes by allocating millions of request object copies in the heap before the request even reaches the scheduling queue. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34756</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3mwp-wvh9-7528 — vLLM: Unauthenticated OOM Denial of Service via Unbounded `n` Parameter in OpenAI API Server</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3mwp-wvh9-7528</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in the vLLM OpenAI-compatible API server. Due to the lack of an upper bound validation on the `n` parameter in the `ChatCompletionRequest` and `CompletionRequest` Pydantic models, an unauthenticated attacker can send a single HTTP request with an astronomically large `n` value. This completely blocks the Python `asyncio` event loop and causes immediate Out-Of-Memory crashes by allocating millions of request object copies in the heap before the request even reaches the scheduling queue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the missing upper bound checks across the request parsing and asynchronous scheduling layers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Protocol Layer:**
   In `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py`, the `n` parameter is defined simply as an integer without any `pydantic.Field` constraints for an upper bound.
```python
class ChatCompletionRequest(OpenAIBaseModel):
    # Ordered by official OpenAI API documentation
    # https://platform.openai.com/docs/api/reference/chat/create
    messages: list[ChatCompletionMessageParam]
    model: str | None = None
    frequency_penalty: float | None = 0.0
    logit_bias: dict[str, float] | None = None
    logprobs: bool | None = False
    top_logprobs: int | None = 0
    max_tokens: int | None = Field(
        default=None,
        deprecated=&amp;#34;max_tokens is deprecated in favor of &amp;#34;
        &amp;#34;the max_completion_tokens field&amp;#34;,
    )
    max_completion_tokens: int | None…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in the vLLM OpenAI-compatible API server. Due to the lack of an upper bound validation on the `n` parameter in the `ChatCompletionRequest` and `CompletionRequest` Pydantic models, an unauthenticated attacker can send a single HTTP request with an astronomically large `n` value. This completely blocks the Python `asyncio` event loop and causes immediate Out-Of-Memory crashes by allocating millions of request object copies in the heap before the request even reaches the scheduling queue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The root cause of this vulnerability lies in the missing upper bound checks across the request parsing and asynchronous scheduling layers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Protocol Layer:**
   In `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py`, the `n` parameter is defined simply as an integer without any `pydantic.Field` constraints for an upper bound.
```python
class ChatCompletionRequest(OpenAIBaseModel):
    # Ordered by official OpenAI API documentation
    # https://platform.openai.com/docs/api/reference/chat/create
    messages: list[ChatCompletionMessageParam]
    model: str | None = None
    frequency_penalty: float | None = 0.0
    logit_bias: dict[str, float] | None = None
    logprobs: bool | None = False
    top_logprobs: int | None = 0
    max_tokens: int | None = Field(
        default=None,
        deprecated=&amp;#34;max_tokens is deprecated in favor of &amp;#34;
        &amp;#34;the max_completion_tokens field&amp;#34;,
    )
    max_completion_tokens: int | None…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3mwp-wvh9-7528</guid>
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