https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 22 Oct 2026 09:27:26 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34231 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mixxorz slippers</p> <p>Slippers is a UI component framework for Django. Prior to version 0.6.3, a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the {% attrs %} template tag of the slippers Django package. When a context variable containing untrusted data is passed to {% attrs %}, the value is interpolated into an HTML attribute string without escaping, allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript into the rendered page. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.3.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mixxorz slippers</p> <p>Slippers is a UI component framework for Django. Prior to version 0.6.3, a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the {% attrs %} template tag of the slippers Django package. When a context variable containing untrusted data is passed to {% attrs %}, the value is interpolated into an HTML attribute string without escaping, allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript into the rendered page. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.3.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-34231 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w7rv-gfp4-j9j3 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: slippers</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the `{% attrs %}` template tag of the `slippers` Django package. When a context variable containing untrusted data is passed to `{% attrs %}`, the value is interpolated into an HTML attribute string without escaping, allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript into the rendered page.</p> <p>## Vulnerability details</p> <p>### Root cause</p> <p>`AttrsNode` is a custom `Node` subclass registered via `register.tag()`. Unlike `register.simple_tag()`, which automatically applies `conditional_escape()` when autoescape is on, custom `Node.render()` methods receive no automatic escaping and are fully responsible for sanitising their output. `attr_string()` fails to do this:</p> <p>```python def attr_string(key: str, value: Any): if isinstance(value, bool): return key if value else &#34;&#34; key = key.replace(&#34;_&#34;, &#34;-&#34;) return f&#39;{key}=&#34;{value}&#34;&#39; # value is not escaped ```</p> <p>### Attack scenario</p> <p>Given a template that uses `{% attrs %}` with a user-supplied value:</p> <p>```django {% load slippers %} &lt;input {% attrs type placeholder %}&gt; ```</p> <p>```python render(request, &#34;search.html&#34;, {&#34;placeholder&#34;: request.GET.get(&#34;q&#34;, &#34;&#34;)}) ```</p> <p>An attacker crafting a request with `q=&#34; onmouseover=&#34;alert(document.cookie)&#34; x=&#34;` produces:</p> <p>```html &lt;input type=&#34;text&#34; placeholder=&#34;&#34; onmouseover=&#34;alert(document.cookie)&#34; x=&#34;&#34;&gt; ```</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Any template that passes values derived from user input, database…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: slippers</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>A Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the `{% attrs %}` template tag of the `slippers` Django package. When a context variable containing untrusted data is passed to `{% attrs %}`, the value is interpolated into an HTML attribute string without escaping, allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript into the rendered page.</p> <p>## Vulnerability details</p> <p>### Root cause</p> <p>`AttrsNode` is a custom `Node` subclass registered via `register.tag()`. Unlike `register.simple_tag()`, which automatically applies `conditional_escape()` when autoescape is on, custom `Node.render()` methods receive no automatic escaping and are fully responsible for sanitising their output. `attr_string()` fails to do this:</p> <p>```python def attr_string(key: str, value: Any): if isinstance(value, bool): return key if value else &#34;&#34; key = key.replace(&#34;_&#34;, &#34;-&#34;) return f&#39;{key}=&#34;{value}&#34;&#39; # value is not escaped ```</p> <p>### Attack scenario</p> <p>Given a template that uses `{% attrs %}` with a user-supplied value:</p> <p>```django {% load slippers %} &lt;input {% attrs type placeholder %}&gt; ```</p> <p>```python render(request, &#34;search.html&#34;, {&#34;placeholder&#34;: request.GET.get(&#34;q&#34;, &#34;&#34;)}) ```</p> <p>An attacker crafting a request with `q=&#34; onmouseover=&#34;alert(document.cookie)&#34; x=&#34;` produces:</p> <p>```html &lt;input type=&#34;text&#34; placeholder=&#34;&#34; onmouseover=&#34;alert(document.cookie)&#34; x=&#34;&#34;&gt; ```</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>Any template that passes values derived from user input, database…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w7rv-gfp4-j9j3