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      <title>CVE-2026-41486 — Ray: Remote Code Execution via Parquet Arrow Extension Type Deserialization</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-41486</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ray-project ray&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ray is an AI compute engine. From version 2.54.0 to before version 2.55.0, Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (ray.data.arrow_tensor, ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2, ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls __arrow_ext_deserialize__ on the field&amp;#39;s metadata bytes. Ray&amp;#39;s implementation passes these bytes directly to cloudpickle.loads(), achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read. This issue has been patched in version 2.55.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ray-project ray&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ray is an AI compute engine. From version 2.54.0 to before version 2.55.0, Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (ray.data.arrow_tensor, ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2, ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls __arrow_ext_deserialize__ on the field&amp;#39;s metadata bytes. Ray&amp;#39;s implementation passes these bytes directly to cloudpickle.loads(), achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read. This issue has been patched in version 2.55.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-41486</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mw35-8rx3-xf9r — Ray: Remote Code Execution via Parquet Arrow Extension Type Deserialization</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mw35-8rx3-xf9r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ray&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (`ray.data.arrow_tensor`, `ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2`, `ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor`) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls `__arrow_ext_deserialize__` on the field&amp;#39;s metadata bytes. Ray&amp;#39;s implementation passes these bytes directly to `cloudpickle.loads()`, achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In May 2024, Ray fixed a related vulnerability in `PyExtensionType`-based extension types ([issue #41314](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/issues/41314), [PR #45084](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/45084)). In July 2025, [PR #54831](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/54831) introduced `cloudpickle.loads()` into the replacement extension types&amp;#39; deserialization path, reintroducing the same class of vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Affected versions**: Ray 2.49.0 through 2.54.0 (latest release as of March 2026). The vulnerable `_deserialize_with_fallback` function with `cloudpickle.loads()` was introduced in commit `f6d21db1a4` ([PR #54831](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/54831), July 2025), first released in Ray 2.49.0.
- **Affected configurations**: Any process that uses Ray Data and reads Parquet files. The extension types are registered globally in PyArrow, so all Parquet reads in the process are affected, including `ray.data.read_parquet()`, `pyarrow.parquet.read_table()`, `pandas.read_parqu…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: ray&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (`ray.data.arrow_tensor`, `ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2`, `ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor`) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls `__arrow_ext_deserialize__` on the field&amp;#39;s metadata bytes. Ray&amp;#39;s implementation passes these bytes directly to `cloudpickle.loads()`, achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In May 2024, Ray fixed a related vulnerability in `PyExtensionType`-based extension types ([issue #41314](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/issues/41314), [PR #45084](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/45084)). In July 2025, [PR #54831](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/54831) introduced `cloudpickle.loads()` into the replacement extension types&amp;#39; deserialization path, reintroducing the same class of vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Affected versions**: Ray 2.49.0 through 2.54.0 (latest release as of March 2026). The vulnerable `_deserialize_with_fallback` function with `cloudpickle.loads()` was introduced in commit `f6d21db1a4` ([PR #54831](https://github.com/ray-project/ray/pull/54831), July 2025), first released in Ray 2.49.0.
- **Affected configurations**: Any process that uses Ray Data and reads Parquet files. The extension types are registered globally in PyArrow, so all Parquet reads in the process are affected, including `ray.data.read_parquet()`, `pyarrow.parquet.read_table()`, `pandas.read_parqu…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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