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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>BREW-glances-CVE-2026-32608 — Glances has a Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-glances-cve-2026-32608</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. Prior to 4.5.2, when a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. Prior to 4.5.2, when a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-glances-cve-2026-32608</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-32608 — Glances has a Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32608</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nicolargo glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. Prior to 4.5.2, when a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; nicolargo glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. Prior to 4.5.2, when a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands. Version 4.5.2 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32608</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7 — Glances has a Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vcv2-q258-wrg7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. When a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**The action execution flow:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Admin configures an action in glances.conf (documented feature):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ini
[cpu]
critical_action=echo &amp;#34;High CPU on {{name}}&amp;#34; | mail admin@example.com
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. When the threshold is exceeded, the plugin model renders the template with runtime stats (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:943):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
self.actions.run(stat_name, trigger, command, repeat, mustache_dict=mustache_dict)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. The mustache_dict contains the full stat dictionary, including user-controllable fields like process name, filesystem mnt_point, container name, etc. (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:920-943).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4. In glances/actions.py:77-78, the Mustache library renders the template:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```pyt…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Glances&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Glances action system allows administrators to configure shell commands that execute when monitoring thresholds are exceeded. These commands support Mustache template variables (e.g., `{{name}}`, `{{key}}`) that are populated with runtime monitoring data. The `secure_popen()` function, which executes these commands, implements its own pipe, redirect, and chain operator handling by splitting the command string before passing each segment to `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)`. When a Mustache-rendered value (such as a process name, filesystem mount point, or container name) contains pipe, redirect, or chain metacharacters, the rendered command is split in unintended ways, allowing an attacker who controls a process name or container name to inject arbitrary commands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**The action execution flow:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Admin configures an action in glances.conf (documented feature):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ini
[cpu]
critical_action=echo &amp;#34;High CPU on {{name}}&amp;#34; | mail admin@example.com
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. When the threshold is exceeded, the plugin model renders the template with runtime stats (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:943):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
self.actions.run(stat_name, trigger, command, repeat, mustache_dict=mustache_dict)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. The mustache_dict contains the full stat dictionary, including user-controllable fields like process name, filesystem mnt_point, container name, etc. (glances/plugins/plugin/model.py:920-943).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4. In glances/actions.py:77-78, the Mustache library renders the template:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```pyt…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vcv2-q258-wrg7</guid>
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