CVE-2026-22807 — vLLM affected by RCE via auto_map dynamic module loading during model initialization

Affected: vllm-project vllm, Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.2, Red Hat AI Inference Server 3.3, Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.3, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat AI Inference Server, Red Hat Enterprise Linux AI (RHEL AI) 3, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)

vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.14.0, vLLM loads Hugging Face `auto_map` dynamic modules during model resolution without gating on `trust_remote_code`, allowing attacker-controlled Python code in a model repo/path to execute at server startup. An attacker who can influence the model repo/path (local directory or remote Hugging Face repo) can achieve arbitrary code execution on the vLLM host during model load. This happens before any request handling and does not require API access. Version 0.14.0 fixes the issue.

GHSA-2pc9-4j83-qjmr — vLLM affected by RCE via auto_map dynamic module loading during model initialization

Affected: PyPI: vllm

# Summary

vLLM loads Hugging Face `auto_map` dynamic modules during model resolution **without gating on `trust_remote_code`**, allowing attacker-controlled Python code in a model repo/path to execute at server startup.

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# Impact

An attacker who can influence the model repo/path (local directory or remote Hugging Face repo) can achieve **arbitrary code execution** on the vLLM host during model load. This happens **before any request handling** and does **not require API access**.

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# Affected Versions

All versions where `vllm/model_executor/models/registry.py` resolves `auto_map` entries with `try_get_class_from_dynamic_module` **without checking `trust_remote_code`** (at least current `main`).

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# Details

During model resolution, vLLM unconditionally iterates `auto_map` entries from the model config and calls `try_get_class_from_dynamic_module`, which delegates to Transformers’ `get_class_from_dynamic_module` and **executes the module code**.

This occurs even when `trust_remote_code` is `false`, allowing a malicious model repo to embed code in a referenced module and have it executed during initialization.

### Relevant code

- `vllm/model_executor/models/registry.py:856` — auto_map resolution - `vllm/transformers_utils/dynamic_module.py:13` — delegates to `get_class_from_dynamic_module`, which executes code

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# Fixes

* https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32194

# Credits

Reported by **bugbunny.ai**

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CVE-2026-22807 — vLLM affected by RCE via auto_map dynamic module loading during model initialization

GHSA-2pc9-4j83-qjmr — vLLM affected by RCE via auto_map dynamic module loading during model initialization