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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:51:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-67502 — Taguette does not safeguard against Open Redirect</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-67502</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; remram44 taguette&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Taguette is an open source qualitative research tool. In versions 1.5.1 and below,  attackers can craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. The application accepts a user-controlled next parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; remram44 taguette&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Taguette is an open source qualitative research tool. In versions 1.5.1 and below,  attackers can craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. The application accepts a user-controlled next parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware. This issue is fixed in version 1.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-67502</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5923-r76v-mprm — Open Redirect Vulnerability in Taguette</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5923-r76v-mprm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: taguette&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in Taguette that allows attackers to craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity:** Medium to High&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application accepts a user-controlled `next` parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. The vulnerable code is located in two places:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Location 1: Login Handler (`taguette/web/views.py`, lines 140-144)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _go_to_next(self):
    next_ = self.get_argument(&amp;#39;next&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
    if not next_:
        next_ = self.reverse_url(&amp;#39;index&amp;#39;)
    return self.redirect(next_)  # ← No validation of next_ parameter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This method is called after successful login (line 132) and when an already-logged-in user visits the login page (line 109).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Location 2: Cookies Prompt Handler (`taguette/web/views.py`, lines 79-85)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def post(self):
    self.set_cookie(&amp;#39;cookies_accepted&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;yes&amp;#39;, dont_check=True)
    next_ = self.get_argument(&amp;#39;next&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
    if not next_:
        next_ = self.reverse_url(&amp;#39;index&amp;#39;)
    return self.redirect(next_)  # ← No validation of next_ parameter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In both cases, if `next_` is provided by the user, it is passed directly to `self.redirect()` without checking whether it points to the s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: taguette&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in Taguette that allows attackers to craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity:** Medium to High&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application accepts a user-controlled `next` parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. The vulnerable code is located in two places:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Location 1: Login Handler (`taguette/web/views.py`, lines 140-144)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _go_to_next(self):
    next_ = self.get_argument(&amp;#39;next&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
    if not next_:
        next_ = self.reverse_url(&amp;#39;index&amp;#39;)
    return self.redirect(next_)  # ← No validation of next_ parameter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This method is called after successful login (line 132) and when an already-logged-in user visits the login page (line 109).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Location 2: Cookies Prompt Handler (`taguette/web/views.py`, lines 79-85)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def post(self):
    self.set_cookie(&amp;#39;cookies_accepted&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;yes&amp;#39;, dont_check=True)
    next_ = self.get_argument(&amp;#39;next&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;)
    if not next_:
        next_ = self.reverse_url(&amp;#39;index&amp;#39;)
    return self.redirect(next_)  # ← No validation of next_ parameter
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In both cases, if `next_` is provided by the user, it is passed directly to `self.redirect()` without checking whether it points to the s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5923-r76v-mprm</guid>
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