https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 12:27:29 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-23633 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> HumanSignal label-studio</p> <p>Label Studio, an open source data labeling tool had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. Prior to version 1.10.1, this feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.</p> <p>`data_import/uploader.py` lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, `data_import/api.py`lines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension. Since the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker cou…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> HumanSignal label-studio</p> <p>Label Studio, an open source data labeling tool had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. Prior to version 1.10.1, this feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.</p> <p>`data_import/uploader.py` lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, `data_import/api.py`lines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension. Since the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker cou…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-23633 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fq23-g58m-799r <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: label-studio</p> <p># Introduction</p> <p>This write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.10.1` and was tested on version `1.9.2.post0`.</p> <p># Overview</p> <p>[Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio) had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. This feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website.</p> <p># Description</p> <p>The following [code snippet in Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146) showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL.</p> <p>```python def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list): &#34;&#34;&#34;Download file using URL and read tasks from it&#34;&#34;&#34; # process URL with tasks try: filename = url.rsplit(&#39;/&#39;, 1)[-1] &lt;1&gt;</p> <p>response = ssrf_safe_get( url, verify=project.organization.should_verify_ssl_certs(), stream=True, headers={&#39;Accept-Encoding&#39;: None} ) file_content = response.content check_tasks_max_file_size(int(response.headers[&#39;content-length&#39;])) file_upload = create_file_upload(user,…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: label-studio</p> <p># Introduction</p> <p>This write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.10.1` and was tested on version `1.9.2.post0`.</p> <p># Overview</p> <p>[Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio) had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. This feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website.</p> <p># Description</p> <p>The following [code snippet in Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146) showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL.</p> <p>```python def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list): &#34;&#34;&#34;Download file using URL and read tasks from it&#34;&#34;&#34; # process URL with tasks try: filename = url.rsplit(&#39;/&#39;, 1)[-1] &lt;1&gt;</p> <p>response = ssrf_safe_get( url, verify=project.organization.should_verify_ssl_certs(), stream=True, headers={&#39;Accept-Encoding&#39;: None} ) file_content = response.content check_tasks_max_file_size(int(response.headers[&#39;content-length&#39;])) file_upload = create_file_upload(user,…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fq23-g58m-799r