https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 21:36:19 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-51649 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> nautobot</p> <p>Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform built as a web application atop the Django Python framework with a PostgreSQL or MySQL database. When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level `extras.run_job` permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case. A user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs. Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 and 2.1.0</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> nautobot</p> <p>Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform built as a web application atop the Django Python framework with a PostgreSQL or MySQL database. When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level `extras.run_job` permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case. A user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs. Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 and 2.1.0</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-51649 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vf5m-xrhm-v999 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nautobot</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level `extras.run_job` permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general?). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this *specific* Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case (`/extras/job-button/&lt;uuid&gt;/run/`) The effect is that a user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs.</p> <p>&gt; Not all Jobs can be configured as JobButtons; only those implemented as subclasses of `JobButtonReceiver` can be used in this way, so this vulnerability only applies specifically to `JobButtonReceiver` subclasses.</p> <p>Additionally, although the documentation states that both `extras.run_job` permission and `extras.run_jobbutton` permission must be granted to a user in order to run Jobs via JobButton, the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission is not actually enforced by the view code, only by the UI by disabling the button from being clicked normally. Furthermore, the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission never prevented invoking Jobs (including `JobButtonReceiver` subclasses) via the normal &#34;Job Run&#34; UI, so after some discussion, we&#39;ve decided that the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission is redundant, and as it never achieved its stated/documented purpose, the fixes below will remove the UI check for `extras.run_jobbutton` and all other references to the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission, rather than adding enforcement…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nautobot</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level `extras.run_job` permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general?). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this *specific* Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case (`/extras/job-button/&lt;uuid&gt;/run/`) The effect is that a user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs.</p> <p>&gt; Not all Jobs can be configured as JobButtons; only those implemented as subclasses of `JobButtonReceiver` can be used in this way, so this vulnerability only applies specifically to `JobButtonReceiver` subclasses.</p> <p>Additionally, although the documentation states that both `extras.run_job` permission and `extras.run_jobbutton` permission must be granted to a user in order to run Jobs via JobButton, the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission is not actually enforced by the view code, only by the UI by disabling the button from being clicked normally. Furthermore, the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission never prevented invoking Jobs (including `JobButtonReceiver` subclasses) via the normal &#34;Job Run&#34; UI, so after some discussion, we&#39;ve decided that the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission is redundant, and as it never achieved its stated/documented purpose, the fixes below will remove the UI check for `extras.run_jobbutton` and all other references to the `extras.run_jobbutton` permission, rather than adding enforcement…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vf5m-xrhm-v999