https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 04:26:57 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55991 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> NLnet Labs Unbound</p> <p>In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, a remote unauthenticated client can trigger a libngtcp2 assertion (if compiled with assertions on) and terminate the entire Unbound process using a single DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) connection and one normal DNS query. This is caused by an erroneous error value passed to libngtcp2. When &#39;ngtcp2_conn_writev_stream()&#39; returns &#39;NGTCP2_ERR_STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED&#39;, Unbound continues to call &#39;ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error()&#39; with a &#39;-1&#39; error value. The &#39;int&#39; literal &#39;-1&#39; is implicitly converted to the function&#39;s &#39;uint64_t error_code&#39; parameter as &#39;0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF&#39;. The follow-on &#39;ngtcp2_conn_write_connection_close()&#39; serialises that value as a QUIC variable-length integer; because &#39;2^64-1&#39; exceeds the 62-bit varint ceiling, &#39;ngtcp2_put_uvarintlen()&#39; fails &#39;assert(n &lt; 4611686018427387904ULL)&#39; and the whole resolver process aborts. A remote, unauthenticated DoQ client can trigger this deterministically with a single QUIC connection by advertising &#39;initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local = 1&#39; in its transport parameters and sending one DoQ query without ever reading the stream.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> NLnet Labs Unbound</p> <p>In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, a remote unauthenticated client can trigger a libngtcp2 assertion (if compiled with assertions on) and terminate the entire Unbound process using a single DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) connection and one normal DNS query. This is caused by an erroneous error value passed to libngtcp2. When &#39;ngtcp2_conn_writev_stream()&#39; returns &#39;NGTCP2_ERR_STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED&#39;, Unbound continues to call &#39;ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error()&#39; with a &#39;-1&#39; error value. The &#39;int&#39; literal &#39;-1&#39; is implicitly converted to the function&#39;s &#39;uint64_t error_code&#39; parameter as &#39;0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF&#39;. The follow-on &#39;ngtcp2_conn_write_connection_close()&#39; serialises that value as a QUIC variable-length integer; because &#39;2^64-1&#39; exceeds the 62-bit varint ceiling, &#39;ngtcp2_put_uvarintlen()&#39; fails &#39;assert(n &lt; 4611686018427387904ULL)&#39; and the whole resolver process aborts. A remote, unauthenticated DoQ client can trigger this deterministically with a single QUIC connection by advertising &#39;initial_max_stream_data_bidi_local = 1&#39; in its transport parameters and sending one DoQ query without ever reading the stream.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55991