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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 08:14:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-32665 — Remote DNS-over-QUIC denial of service due to `quic-size` budget bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32665</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLnet Labs Unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when downstream DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) is enabled, the first two bidirectional streams on a new QUIC connection (stream_id 0 and 4) bypass the per-stream &amp;#39;quic-size&amp;#39; gate entirely, and large input buffers are allocated later, after only the 2-byte length prefix has been received from the initial streams. As a result, a remote client can make Unbound exceed the configured &amp;#39;quic-size&amp;#39; limit with low-cost input. Using only one connection and two streams, each sending a declared 65535-byte length prefix and then holding the streams open, a client can already trivially make Unbound roughly allocate double that amount. This is a remote availability issue / memory-accounting bypass in the downstream DoQ implementation that leads to denial of service for new DoQ clients. This vulnerability needs Unbound to be compiled with DoQ support (&amp;#39;--with-libngtcp2&amp;#39;) and the &amp;#39;quic-port&amp;#39; to be configured for the listening interfaces.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLnet Labs Unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when downstream DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) is enabled, the first two bidirectional streams on a new QUIC connection (stream_id 0 and 4) bypass the per-stream &amp;#39;quic-size&amp;#39; gate entirely, and large input buffers are allocated later, after only the 2-byte length prefix has been received from the initial streams. As a result, a remote client can make Unbound exceed the configured &amp;#39;quic-size&amp;#39; limit with low-cost input. Using only one connection and two streams, each sending a declared 65535-byte length prefix and then holding the streams open, a client can already trivially make Unbound roughly allocate double that amount. This is a remote availability issue / memory-accounting bypass in the downstream DoQ implementation that leads to denial of service for new DoQ clients. This vulnerability needs Unbound to be compiled with DoQ support (&amp;#39;--with-libngtcp2&amp;#39;) and the &amp;#39;quic-port&amp;#39; to be configured for the listening interfaces.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-32665</guid>
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