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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>GHSA-w5vr-6qhr-36cc — `ed25519-dalek` Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w5vr-6qhr-36cc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ed25519-dalek&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Versions of `ed25519-dalek` prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a `Keypair`, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the `S` part of the signature, but not in the `R` value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same `R` and only differ on the `S` part.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Revised public APIs in v2.0 of `ed25519-dalek` do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled &amp;#34;hazmat&amp;#34; APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ed25519-dalek&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Versions of `ed25519-dalek` prior to v2.0 model private and public keys as separate types which can be assembled into a `Keypair`, and also provide APIs for serializing and deserializing 64-byte private/public keypairs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Such APIs and serializations are inherently unsafe as the public key is one of the inputs used in the deterministic computation of the `S` part of the signature, but not in the `R` value. An adversary could somehow use the signing function as an oracle that allows arbitrary public keys as input can obtain two signatures for the same message sharing the same `R` and only differ on the `S` part.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, when this happens, one can easily extract the private key.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Revised public APIs in v2.0 of `ed25519-dalek` do NOT allow a decoupled private/public keypair as signing input, except as part of specially labeled &amp;#34;hazmat&amp;#34; APIs which are clearly labeled as being dangerous if misused.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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