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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>CVE-2023-0460 — Remote code execution in YouTube Android Player API SDK</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-0460</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Google YouTube Android Player API SDK&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The YouTube Embedded 1.2 SDK binds to a service within the YouTube Main App. After binding, a remote context is created with the flags Context.CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE | Context.CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY. This allows the client app to remotely load code from YouTube Main App by retrieving the Main App’s ClassLoader. A potential vulnerability in the binding logic used by the client SDK where the SDK ends up calling bindService() on a malicious app rather than YT Main App. This creates a vulnerability where the SDK can load the malicious app’s ClassLoader instead, allowing the malicious app to load arbitrary code into the calling app whenever the embedded SDK is invoked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order to trigger this vulnerability, an attacker must masquerade the Youtube app and install it on a device, have a second app that uses the Embedded player and typically distribute both to the victim outside of the Play Store.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Google YouTube Android Player API SDK&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The YouTube Embedded 1.2 SDK binds to a service within the YouTube Main App. After binding, a remote context is created with the flags Context.CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE | Context.CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY. This allows the client app to remotely load code from YouTube Main App by retrieving the Main App’s ClassLoader. A potential vulnerability in the binding logic used by the client SDK where the SDK ends up calling bindService() on a malicious app rather than YT Main App. This creates a vulnerability where the SDK can load the malicious app’s ClassLoader instead, allowing the malicious app to load arbitrary code into the calling app whenever the embedded SDK is invoked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order to trigger this vulnerability, an attacker must masquerade the Youtube app and install it on a device, have a second app that uses the Embedded player and typically distribute both to the victim outside of the Play Store.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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