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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 20:12:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2022-2053</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2022-2053</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Undertow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a POST request comes through AJP and the request exceeds the max-post-size limit (maxEntitySize), Undertow&amp;#39;s AjpServerRequestConduit implementation closes a connection without sending any response to the client/proxy. This behavior results in that a front-end proxy marking the backend worker (application server) as an error state and not forward requests to the worker for a while. In mod_cluster, this continues until the next STATUS request (10 seconds intervals) from the application server updates the server state. So, in the worst case, it can result in &amp;#34;All workers are in error state&amp;#34; and mod_cluster responds &amp;#34;503 Service Unavailable&amp;#34; for a while (up to 10 seconds). In mod_proxy_balancer, it does not forward requests to the worker until the &amp;#34;retry&amp;#34; timeout passes. However, luckily, mod_proxy_balancer has &amp;#34;forcerecovery&amp;#34; setting (On by default; this parameter can force the immediate recovery of all workers without considering the retry parameter of the workers if all workers of a balancer are in error state.). So, unlike mod_cluster, mod_proxy_balancer does not result in responding &amp;#34;503 Service Unavailable&amp;#34;. An attacker could use this behavior to send a malicious request and trigger server errors, resulting in DoS (denial of service). This flaw was fixed in Undertow 2.2.19.Final, Undertow 2.3.0.Alpha2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Undertow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a POST request comes through AJP and the request exceeds the max-post-size limit (maxEntitySize), Undertow&amp;#39;s AjpServerRequestConduit implementation closes a connection without sending any response to the client/proxy. This behavior results in that a front-end proxy marking the backend worker (application server) as an error state and not forward requests to the worker for a while. In mod_cluster, this continues until the next STATUS request (10 seconds intervals) from the application server updates the server state. So, in the worst case, it can result in &amp;#34;All workers are in error state&amp;#34; and mod_cluster responds &amp;#34;503 Service Unavailable&amp;#34; for a while (up to 10 seconds). In mod_proxy_balancer, it does not forward requests to the worker until the &amp;#34;retry&amp;#34; timeout passes. However, luckily, mod_proxy_balancer has &amp;#34;forcerecovery&amp;#34; setting (On by default; this parameter can force the immediate recovery of all workers without considering the retry parameter of the workers if all workers of a balancer are in error state.). So, unlike mod_cluster, mod_proxy_balancer does not result in responding &amp;#34;503 Service Unavailable&amp;#34;. An attacker could use this behavior to send a malicious request and trigger server errors, resulting in DoS (denial of service). This flaw was fixed in Undertow 2.2.19.Final, Undertow 2.3.0.Alpha2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2022-2053</guid>
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