<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 02:43:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2019-18800</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2019-18800</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Viber through 11.7.0.5 allows a remote attacker who can capture a victim&amp;#39;s internet traffic to steal their Viber account, because not all Viber protocol traffic is encrypted. TCP data packet 9 on port 4244 from the victim&amp;#39;s device contains cleartext information such as the device model and OS version, IMSI, and 20 bytes of udid in a binary format, which is located at offset 0x14 of this packet. Then, the attacker installs Viber on his device, initiates the registration process for any phone number, but doesn&amp;#39;t enter a pin from SMS. Instead, he closes Viber. Next, the attacker rewrites his udid with the victim&amp;#39;s udid, modifying the viber_udid file, which is located in the Viber preferences folder. (The udid is stored in a hexadecimal format.) Finally, the attacker starts Viber again and enters the pin from SMS.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Viber through 11.7.0.5 allows a remote attacker who can capture a victim&amp;#39;s internet traffic to steal their Viber account, because not all Viber protocol traffic is encrypted. TCP data packet 9 on port 4244 from the victim&amp;#39;s device contains cleartext information such as the device model and OS version, IMSI, and 20 bytes of udid in a binary format, which is located at offset 0x14 of this packet. Then, the attacker installs Viber on his device, initiates the registration process for any phone number, but doesn&amp;#39;t enter a pin from SMS. Instead, he closes Viber. Next, the attacker rewrites his udid with the victim&amp;#39;s udid, modifying the viber_udid file, which is located in the Viber preferences folder. (The udid is stored in a hexadecimal format.) Finally, the attacker starts Viber again and enters the pin from SMS.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2019-18800</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
