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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 18:27:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-5857 — Contiki-NG MQTT Client Out-of-Bounds Write in PUBLISH Topic Parser via Persistent State Between TCP Segments</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-5857</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Contiki-NG&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Contiki-NG&amp;#39;s MQTT client parse_publish_vhdr() in os/net/app-layer/mqtt/mqtt.c sets topic_len_received=1 before checking topic_len against the 64-byte limit, so an over-length topic returns early but leaves the flag set. On the next TCP segment, tcp_input() re-invokes the parser with topic_received==0, and the persisted topic_len_received==1 skips the length-reading block containing the guard, falling through directly to a memcpy() that uses the unvalidated 16-bit topic_len as the copy length. The 65-byte topic[] destination overruns into adjacent struct fields including the payload_chunk pointer, which subsequent MQTT code dereferences, giving a compromised or attacker-controlled broker an arbitrary-pointer-write primitive. Contiki-NG&amp;#39;s MQTT implementation has no TLS support so the connection is plaintext. Impact ranges from information disclosure and denial of service to remote code execution on embedded targets without memory protection.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Contiki-NG&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Contiki-NG&amp;#39;s MQTT client parse_publish_vhdr() in os/net/app-layer/mqtt/mqtt.c sets topic_len_received=1 before checking topic_len against the 64-byte limit, so an over-length topic returns early but leaves the flag set. On the next TCP segment, tcp_input() re-invokes the parser with topic_received==0, and the persisted topic_len_received==1 skips the length-reading block containing the guard, falling through directly to a memcpy() that uses the unvalidated 16-bit topic_len as the copy length. The 65-byte topic[] destination overruns into adjacent struct fields including the payload_chunk pointer, which subsequent MQTT code dereferences, giving a compromised or attacker-controlled broker an arbitrary-pointer-write primitive. Contiki-NG&amp;#39;s MQTT implementation has no TLS support so the connection is plaintext. Impact ranges from information disclosure and denial of service to remote code execution on embedded targets without memory protection.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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