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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:53:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2020-35861</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2020-35861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered in the bumpalo crate before 3.2.1 for Rust. The realloc feature allows the reading of unknown memory. Attackers can potentially read cryptographic keys.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;An issue was discovered in the bumpalo crate before 3.2.1 for Rust. The realloc feature allows the reading of unknown memory. Attackers can potentially read cryptographic keys.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2020-35861</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2020-0006 — Flaw in `realloc` allows reading unknown memory</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2020-0006</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: bumpalo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `realloc`ing, if we allocate new space, we need to copy the old
allocation&amp;#39;s bytes into the new space. There are `old_size` number of bytes in
the old allocation, but we were accidentally copying `new_size` number of bytes,
which could lead to copying bytes into the realloc&amp;#39;d space from past the chunk
that we&amp;#39;re bump allocating out of, from unknown memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an attacker can cause `realloc`s, and can read the `realoc`ed data back,
this could allow them to read things from other regions of memory that they
shouldn&amp;#39;t be able to. For example, if some crypto keys happened to live in
memory right after a chunk we were bump allocating out of, this could allow
the attacker to read the crypto keys.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Beyond just fixing the bug and adding a regression test, I&amp;#39;ve also taken two
additional steps:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. While we were already running the testsuite under `valgrind` in CI, because
   `valgrind` exits with the same code that the program did, if there are
   invalid reads/writes that happen not to trigger a segfault, the program can
   still exit OK and we will be none the wiser. I&amp;#39;ve enabled the
   `--error-exitcode=1` flag for `valgrind` in CI so that tests eagerly fail
   in these scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. I&amp;#39;ve written a quickcheck test to exercise `realloc`. Without the bug fix
   in this patch, this quickcheck immediately triggers invalid reads when run
   under `valgrind`. We didn&amp;#39;t previously have quickchecks that exercised
   `realloc` because `realloc` isn&amp;#39;t publicly exposed directly, and i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: bumpalo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `realloc`ing, if we allocate new space, we need to copy the old
allocation&amp;#39;s bytes into the new space. There are `old_size` number of bytes in
the old allocation, but we were accidentally copying `new_size` number of bytes,
which could lead to copying bytes into the realloc&amp;#39;d space from past the chunk
that we&amp;#39;re bump allocating out of, from unknown memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an attacker can cause `realloc`s, and can read the `realoc`ed data back,
this could allow them to read things from other regions of memory that they
shouldn&amp;#39;t be able to. For example, if some crypto keys happened to live in
memory right after a chunk we were bump allocating out of, this could allow
the attacker to read the crypto keys.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Beyond just fixing the bug and adding a regression test, I&amp;#39;ve also taken two
additional steps:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. While we were already running the testsuite under `valgrind` in CI, because
   `valgrind` exits with the same code that the program did, if there are
   invalid reads/writes that happen not to trigger a segfault, the program can
   still exit OK and we will be none the wiser. I&amp;#39;ve enabled the
   `--error-exitcode=1` flag for `valgrind` in CI so that tests eagerly fail
   in these scenarios.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. I&amp;#39;ve written a quickcheck test to exercise `realloc`. Without the bug fix
   in this patch, this quickcheck immediately triggers invalid reads when run
   under `valgrind`. We didn&amp;#39;t previously have quickchecks that exercised
   `realloc` because `realloc` isn&amp;#39;t publicly exposed directly, and i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2020-0006</guid>
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