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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:10:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-116794 — russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-116794</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eugeny russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server&amp;#39;s Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eugeny russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server&amp;#39;s Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-116794</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0495 — Agent server signs with confirm-constrained keys without calling `Agent::confirm`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0495</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A key added to an SSH agent with the confirm constraint (what `ssh-add -c` sends) must not be used to sign until the user approves each use. russh&amp;#39;s agent server (`russh::keys::agent::server`) accepted the constraint, but when a sign request arrived for such a key it used a fixed `true` in place of the result of `Agent::confirm`, so the application&amp;#39;s confirmation step never ran. This started in 0.50.0-beta.12; 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 still called `confirm`, and earlier russh releases have no agent server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any process that can reach the agent, including a remote host when the agent is forwarded, can then sign with the protected key without the user&amp;#39;s approval, for example to log in elsewhere as the user. The private key itself is not disclosed. Agents whose `Agent::confirm` keeps the default, which always returns `true`, behave the same before and after the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.65.0 the agent server calls `Agent::confirm` for confirm-constrained keys and refuses to sign when it returns `false`. Implementations that left `confirm` unimplemented (for example as `todo!()`) will now reach that code.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A key added to an SSH agent with the confirm constraint (what `ssh-add -c` sends) must not be used to sign until the user approves each use. russh&amp;#39;s agent server (`russh::keys::agent::server`) accepted the constraint, but when a sign request arrived for such a key it used a fixed `true` in place of the result of `Agent::confirm`, so the application&amp;#39;s confirmation step never ran. This started in 0.50.0-beta.12; 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 still called `confirm`, and earlier russh releases have no agent server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any process that can reach the agent, including a remote host when the agent is forwarded, can then sign with the protected key without the user&amp;#39;s approval, for example to log in elsewhere as the user. The private key itself is not disclosed. Agents whose `Agent::confirm` keeps the default, which always returns `true`, behave the same before and after the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.65.0 the agent server calls `Agent::confirm` for confirm-constrained keys and refuses to sign when it returns `false`. Implementations that left `confirm` unimplemented (for example as `todo!()`) will now reach that code.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0495</guid>
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